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The last decade has witnessed an increase in policies with the dual objective of 
tackling food insecurity and poverty. Whether both objectives can be optimally 
achieved with the same policy instrument, however, warrants closer examination. This 
dissertation is comprised of three independent studies examining such policies. The 
first study evaluates a local food aid procurement project conducted in Guatemala for 
food emergency relief based on five different dimensions: impact on market prices, 
recipient satisfaction, timeliness, costliness and smallholder development. We find no 
price or price volatility associations with local procurement but find mixed results 
along the other dimensions highlighting the need for decision-makers to clearly 
identify and prioritize among the objectives of food assistance interventions. 
The second study examines the impact of a significant demand shock in the 
export pineapple market on smallholder farmer welfare in southern Ghana. Using two 
stage least squares, we estimate duration pre- and post-shock using a bivariate tobit 
model in the first stage and a fixed effects model in the second stage. We then 
compare mean asset wealth for different categories of farmers defined by their time of 
entry and exit relative to the shock. Early adopters (disadopters) are better off than 
later adopters (disadopters), and non-adopters are as well off as early adopters who 
 disadopt early, questioning the long-term welfare gains of smallholders often 
associated with the adoption of cash crops. 
The final study uses panel experimental data from maize field trials 
geographically dispersed throughout Malawi to estimate the expected marginal 
physical returns to fertilizer use conditional on a range of agronomic factors. Using 
these estimated returns and historical price and weather data, we simulate the expected 
marginal profitability of fertilizer application and the correlation of those expected 
returns with headcount poverty rates. We find that the fertilizer bundles distributed 
under Malawi’s subsidy program are almost always profitable, but the correlation 
between the expected gains to increased fertilizer use and a location’s poverty level is 
weak at best, calling into question how effectively fertilizer subsidies help reduce rural 
poverty. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been an increased focus in the last decade by governments, donors and 
policy-makers to tackle both food insecurity and poverty by helping smallholders 
participate in modern supply chains and/or facilitating their access to improved 
agricultural production inputs. Indeed, despite significant migration to urban centers and 
evidence of significant rural non-farm income in the last several decades, estimates show 
that ¾ of the world’s poor continue to live in rural areas, relying on agriculture as their 
primary livelihood (Davis et al. 2010, World Bank 2008, Reardon 1997). 
From approximately the 1950s to the 1980s, food supply chains were commonly 
state-led, large-scale operations. State-controlled marketing boards, for example, 
controlled the sale or purchase of agricultural commodities, fixing prices and absorbing 
any excess production through well-established buying networks and storage facilities. 
While marketing boards provided farmers with a guaranteed market, usually at prices 
below import parity, it reduced competition and induced large inefficiencies, ultimately 
leading towards their elimination (Reardon et al. 2009). Nonetheless, there was some 
support for small-scale production. For example, several governments promoted fertilizer 
use during the 1970s and early 1980s, e.g., through direct subsidies, input credit 
programs, centralized fertilizer procurement and distribution sites, etc., with some 
success (Denning et al. 2009). However, there was a general phase out of input subsidy 
programs in the 1990s, generally due to fiscal constraints or corruption or inefficiency. 
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Since the 1980s liberalized rules of trade and foreign direct investment, as well as 
improvements in logistics and infrastructure, have spurred foreign and domestic private 
investment in the processing and retail segments of agrifood supply chains. These trends, 
partly driven by broader income growth and urbanization, have led to the rapid 
emergence of supermarkets, convenience stores and fast food chains in the developing 
world (Reardon et al. 2009). Furthermore, due in part to severe climate events and the 
2007-2008 price crisis, there has been a resurgence of policies promoting agricultural 
input use, e.g. subsidization of fertilizer, that have had a certain degree of success 
(Denning et al. 2009). The last decade has also witnessed an increase in structured public 
sector demand for locally and regionally procured (LRP) food aid, a procurement tool 
that can increase the timeliness and reduce the cost of emergency food aid deliveries. For 
example, the LRP share of World Food Program (WFP) deliveries reached 67% in 2010, 
up from 11% as recently as 1999 (WFP 2011a). Since launching a five-year pilot project 
called Purchase for Progress (P4P) in 21 countries in 2008, WFP estimates that in 2010 it 
purchased 14% of its food from smallholders (WFP 2011b). At the same time, there has 
been growing demand by consumers and regulators for information regarding the 
sustainability attributes of products. Purchasers seek additional product information 
including the economic gains to historically disadvantaged groups (“fair trade”), energy 
use in delivery, food safety and environmental contaminants used. Leading retailers are 
developing multi-dimensional sustainability indices that aim to incorporate these 
different environmental, economic and social attributes. To date, there is limited 
consistency, however, in establishing such indices and little understanding of how 
consumers might view the tradeoffs among social, environmental, nutritional and 
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economic product attributes (Gomez et al. 2011). These recent trends of increased and 
specialized agricultural activity have presented new opportunities for smallholders.  
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the conceptual framework for most 
studies regarding technology adoption or smallholder access (Section 2) and then 
describes some recent relevant background literature (Section 3). Finally, Section 4 
introduces the three subsequent chapters of this dissertation and how they specifically 
contribute to their respective specific literatures. 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
The theoretical starting point for most studies examining market access and 
technology adoption begins with the agricultural household model whereby households 
maximize utility of consumption and leisure subject to a cash income constraint, labor 
time constraint and production technology constraint. Under the assumption that markets 
exist for each good consumed and produced and that all prices are exogenous, solving for 
the first order conditions reveals that the household model can be decomposed into 
independent production and consumption decisions, known as the separable household 
model. As a producer, the household maximizes profit subject to prices of inputs and 
outputs and the available technology. As a consumer, the household chooses 
consumption and leisure to maximize its utility under the income and labor supply 
constraints. If on the other hand, a certain market for a commodity or labor does not exist 
then prices become endogenous linking the two sets of decisions, known as the 
nonseparable household model. Indeed, when households do not participate in markets, 
production and consumption decisions are jointly determined based on the households’ 
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shadow prices (themselves a function of preferences, endowments and technologies) (de 
Janvry et al. 1991). While the conditions necessary for separability are likely rare in 
practice, the separable household model is often used due to its simplicity. 
The canonical non-separable model was developed to examine how the variation 
in transactions costs helps explain why farmers do not engage in markets (de Janvry et al. 
1991). Transaction costs depend on crop- (e.g., storage requirements and processing 
needs) and household-specific features (e.g., education, age and gender that affect search 
costs and negotiating skills) as well as public goods and services (e.g., extension services, 
road access, etc.) (Barrett 2008). These costs create a difference between farmgate and 
market prices, potentially creating participation non-economic depending on a 
households’ shadow price for the good in question. The poorer the institutional and 
physical infrastructure, for example, the greater the price band making a good less 
tradable. The price band creates a kinked demand and supply, decreasing a households’ 
response to prices. Goetz (1992) further develops this model separating the decision of 
market engagement into two stages – whether to trade (either as a buyer or seller) and 
how much to trade, conditional on buying or selling. The factors affecting the amount to 
buy or sell are the same as those affecting the decision of whether to participate in the 
market as a buyer of seller, but not vice versa. There are fixed cost variables affecting the 
participation decision, but not the extent of participation. Key et al. (2000) further 
examine the role of fixed and proportional transaction costs on the household supply 
decision finding that proportional costs are important in selling and fixed transaction 
costs matter for both sellers and buyers. Bellemare and Barrett (2006) find that rural 
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households make the decision to participate in a market and the resulting volume 
decisions sequentially rather than simultaneously.  
The decision to sell or buy at a market is linked to a smallholders’ decision to 
adopt a technology. Indeed, a smallholder’s production technology affects its productivity 
and hence the set of available market participation choices. Moreover, the returns to 
adopting a certain technology depend on the market and the aggregate supply response. 
For example, if markets are well integrated, excess supply can reach more distant 
locations. Finally, a household wishing to consume a certain good can either produce it or 
purchase it. The decision to do so will depend on its comparative advantage of producing 
a certain good (Barrett 2008, Alene et al. 2008). 
 
3. Empirical research 
Considerable research in development economics has been dedicated to the issue 
of technology adoption in an attempt to help increase production and the income of the 
majority of the poor in least developed countries. The more recent studies surrounding 
technology adoption examine the low observed technology adoption rates, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast to countries like India or Mexico which have benefited 
from the Green Revolution. The literature offers a host of explanations for low observed 
adoption rates, including lack of information, credit constraints, taste preferences, 
differences in agroecological conditions and local costs and benefits (Feder et al. 1985, 
Foltz et al. 2011, Suri 2011). A smaller set of the literature examines the dynamics of 
adoption, including the disadoption of technologies (Suri 2011, Moser and Barrett 2006, 
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Neill and Lee 2000). Yet another set of the more recent literature examines the role of 
social learning and networks on technology adoption (Conley and Udry 2010). 
The empirical literature on market access is sparser, perhaps in part due to the 
difficulty of finding adequate measures of access. It is often thought that smallholders in 
remote areas face higher input costs, lower output prices, fewer buyers and a weak access 
to extension services, ultimately reducing their incentives to adopt new technologies and 
participate in the market. However, limited rigorous evidence supports these claims. Part 
of the difficulty lies in the lack of agreement on what market access is, and consequently 
how to best measure it. Most often it is categorized by physical access captured by access 
to roads, costs of transportation and/or travel time to urban markets (Chamberlin and 
Jayne 2012). 
Nonetheless, there are several recent trends in the literature examining different 
aspects of smallholder market access. A large part of this literature examines 
smallholders’ role in the so-called “supermarket revolution”. Modern supply chains tend 
to favor small farmers that can produce consistent volumes of a satisfactory quality. The 
smallholders capable of supplying this quantity and quality are typically better off than 
the average smallholder, e.g., having access to irrigation and/or greenhouses. Even 
controlling for the initial advantages enjoyed by those who participate in modern agrifood 
value chains, smallholders suppliers tend to enjoy higher net earnings per hectare or per 
unit of output marketed, although this is by no means universal nor uniform (Barrett 
2008, Michelson 2013).   
  Nevertheless, participation in modern supply chains can expose smallholders to 
increased risk. For example, if farmers reallocate land and other scarce inputs to an 
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export crop, they become vulnerable to factors outside local market control, e.g., 
changing foreign consumer preferences, exchange rates or trade barriers such as changing 
quality standards. For example, Ashraf et al. (2008) find that an NGO in Kenya offering 
smallholders a package of credit, extension and marketing support services to help 
smallholders grow and sell baby corn and French beans for export initially yielded 
significantly higher incomes for participants. However, their epilogue notes the 
subsequent catastrophic effect when farmers did not meet the new Euro-Retailer Produce 
Working Group Good Agricultural Practices (EurepGap) requirements established in 
2005, driving many farmers to go back to growing staple crops. Maertens and Swinnen 
(2009) study the welfare and labor effects of more stringent standards on smallholder 
contract farming and smallholder welfare of French beans in Senegal. They find 
significant income gains for participants in the French bean value chain, 60 to 110 % 
higher than the average income in the research area. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the sourcing decisions of wholesalers, 
processors and retailers and their relationships with farmers. In some cases, wholesalers 
or processors source predominantly from larger farms or even vertically integrate to run 
their own farms. For example, a study in Kenya shows that in the 1990s the fresh 
vegetable export sector sharply reduced their purchases from small farms to 18%, 
sourcing 40% from their own farms and 42% from large commercial farms (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000).  However, in other cases, sourcing from small farms is more common 
and seen as advantageous. Sourcing from small farmers can be less risky for processors 
or wholesalers because they do not have to rely solely on one or a few suppliers.  
Furthermore, small farmers may be more willing and able to perform highly labor-
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intensive field management practices that are difficult to perform on larger plots. Because 
wholesalers or processors aim to minimize their transaction costs, smallholders closer to 
roads or those with their own transportation means are typically also favored (Reardon et 
al. 2009). 
Because smallholder production is often limited by production inputs such as 
fertilizer, water or credit to buy tools or seeds, resource-providing contracts have 
emerged between wholesalers, processors or retailers and small farmers. Under such 
arrangements, buyers give smallholders access to credit, farm inputs or extension services 
in exchange for a commitment to sell the firm a pre-specified quantity of their output. In 
forward contracts, firms agree to buy products at a pre-specified price, without 
necessarily providing farmers with inputs or other resources. These forward contracts 
insure smallholders against uncertain future prices. 
Partly in order to attract either sort of contract, smallholders may organize 
themselves into cooperatives or other groups in an attempt to make themselves more 
competitive vis-à-vis larger commercial farms or to give them greater bargaining power 
with firms. Farmer based organizations (FBOs) rarely self-organize but are often 
facilitated by an NGO, the government or private companies. The success of collective 
action varies significantly, depending on many factors including the institutional 
arrangement and external environment. The size of the group matters -- while smaller 
groups can benefit from eased governance, larger groups can achieve larger economies of 
scale. The trustworthiness and motivational capacity of the leadership of the FBO is 
critical to its success (Markelova et al. 2009). Furthermore, the type of product also 
affects the potential for collective marketing.  Staple foods are bulkier but easier to store 
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than horticultural or livestock products. On the other hand, the importance of 
transportation, equipment and cold chains with more perishable goods may encourage 
cooperation. Generally, longer market chains make it more difficult for smallholders to 
access markets. 
 
4. Thesis contributions 
The three subsequent chapters of this dissertation are independent research 
papers, each contributing to a small subset of the vast literature that was briefly and 
broadly mentioned above. This section briefly describes these chapters, their key findings 
and how they contribute to their respective relevant literatures. 
 
A. Local and Regional Procurement 
Chapter 2 evaluates a locally procured food aid emergency relief program in the 
department of Santa Rosa in Guatemala. The primary objective of food aid remains to 
help food insecure households combat malnutrition and food insecurity whether caused 
by economic shocks, drought, political unrest or chronic poverty. A host of new food 
assistance instruments, e.g., cash, vouchers, prepositioned food aid and local and regional 
procurement (LRP), have emerged over the last decade with the objective of improved 
timeliness, cost reduction and/or improved nutrition. Additionally, LRP, whether in-kind 
or through cash or vouchers, has been proposed to help stimulate growth through 
agricultural development and promoting smallholder market accessibility. Despite the 
rise of LRP, limited rigorous evidence exists on its impacts and its potential benefits and 
drawbacks. Some evidence suggests that it may reduce time to delivery and costs. Little 
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rigorous evidence exists to support the claim that LRP can improve farmer profitability. 
The paucity of evidence can in part be explained by the difficulty of having an 
appropriate counterfactual group with which to compare LRP. We begin to fill this void 
in chapter 2 by offering a comprehensive evaluation of LRP measured against a 
concomitant multi-year assistance program (MYAP) distributing food aid shipped from 
the United States. We compare these programs along five dimensions: timeliness, 
costliness, price impacts, recipient satisfaction and producer impacts. 
Between August 2010 and September 2011 a private voluntary organization 
(PVO) distributed locally procured monthly rations of white maize, black beans and a 
locally produced fortified corn soy blend (CSB) called Incaparina to 3,000 households in 
the department of Santa Rosa in Guatemala. Meanwhile the same PVO distributed rice, 
pinto beans, CSB and vegetable oil shipped from the US to communities in the 
department of Baja Verapaz. We find that LRP commodities consistently arrived to the 
PVO distribution warehouses sooner than the food coming from the US. Time savings 
ranged from less than one week for CSB to over eight weeks for the cereals (LRP maize 
and US rice), a practically and statistically significant difference. We find that the 
Guatemalan LRP was more expensive than transoceanic food aid. The difference in 
average costs of beans procurement in favor of the US-sourced commodities is small (9 
percent) and not statistically significant. However, the costs for the locally-procured 
fortified CSB, Incaparina, were much higher than for the CSB purchased in and shipped 
from the US. Part of this difference can be explained by the differences in the two 
products where Incaparina is a branded product sold in small (450 gram) retail bags 
whereas the CSB arrived from the US in 25-pound bags. 
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Because procurement could potentially increase prices by causing a demand 
increase or decrease prices in regions distributed, it is important to monitor prices. We 
find no evidence that LRP has an economically or statistically significant effect on prices 
or price volatility in the department of Santa Rosa or markets outside the LRP project 
zone. Food aid recipients in both LRP and MYAP zones were surveyed to elicit how 
satisfied they were with different attributes of the commodities they received and how 
expensive and time consuming it was for them to prepare meals. Food aid recipients 
preferred locally sourced commodities along most criteria studied. LRP commodities also 
required statistically significantly less fuel, time, water use, cooking oil and effort than 
the counterpart MYAP commodities.  
Finally, the PVO sought to procure food locally semi-competitively in an effort to 
support smallholder development by soliciting bids from local farmer based organizations 
(FBOs). However, the inability of the selected FBO to fulfill its contract and supply 
sufficient quantities at the agreed price required, mid-project, that the PVO procure 
competitively by soliciting bids nationally, illustrating the particular challenges 
associated with procuring from smallholders.  
The nuanced results of this in-depth case study highlight the importance of 
carefully considering the objectives of a food assistance intervention and the context in 
which it might be undertaken when deciding whether to procure rations locally. LRP does 
appear to be preferred when time is of the essence, such as in emergency response relief 
situations. LRP may entail higher costs, as was the case here, which must be weighed 
against timeliness gains and potential nutritional gains and recipient satisfaction. Finally, 
while there may be situations in which local sourcing generates synergies between 
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smallholder gains and recipient preferences, the Guatemala case underscores that such 
synergies are by no means guaranteed. The attempt to support smallholder agriculture 
should not be made at the expense of the food insecure in food aid programs justified on 
humanitarian grounds. 
 
B. Duration and timeliness of adoption 
Chapter 3 examines the effect of duration and timing of entry of pineapple 
farmers on welfare in four villages in southern Ghana. There has been much optimism 
about the potential of agriculture and export crops specifically to reduce poverty. For 
example, there is some evidence that smallholders who participate in modern supply 
chains by supplying supermarkets have enjoyed higher net earnings per hectare. In 
response, some aid agencies and NGOs have made efforts to train and equip farmers to 
grow cash crops. In doing so, aid agencies may actually be exposing smallholders to 
increased risk, especially when export crops are susceptible to price collapses due to 
demand shocks, potentially decreasing farmer welfare in the longer-term. Using panel 
data from 1998 and 2009, we study the welfare of pineapple farmers who experienced an 
exogenous demand shock around 2005. Using a two stage least squares approach, we first 
predict the number of months pre- and post-shock a farmer grows pineapple. Using these 
predicted values, we then estimate the effect of duration of pineapple cultivation pre- and 
post-shock on farm household welfare. 
We find that the number of months a farmer grows pineapples before the shock 
has a positive effect on welfare, while duration post-shock has a negative effect. Given 
the second stage estimation, we categorize five types of farmers based on different times 
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of entry and exit of cultivating pineapple. We find that early adopters that exit before the 
shock are the best off among adopters. Nonadopters are as well off as early adopters who 
disadopted early. Early disadopters are always better off than late disadopters. Our results 
suggest that caution must be exercised when introducing and encouraging the adoption of 
new technologies. In the long-run, adopters may be worse off than nonadopters. 
 
C. Poverty and the returns to fertilizer 
The final chapter of this dissertation examines the returns to fertilizer in Malawi. 
Following a severe drought in 2004, Malawi reinstated a subsidized fertilizer program 
resulting in high reported yields. Despite the program’s success, some have criticized it 
for its high costs while others have questioned whether the high yields resulted from the 
program or favorable weather conditions. Furthermore, there is some evidence that while 
subsidies may have increased crop yields, poverty levels have remained the same, raising 
questions about the program’s efficacy in reducing poverty and food insecurity. 
Using nationally representative panel data of plot-level yield experiments, we are 
able to disentangle the productivity impacts of Malawi’s fertilizer subsidy program from 
those of favorable weather while controlling for heterogeneous soil conditions and pest 
pressures. Given this estimated maize production function and historical climate data, we 
generate spatially explicit estimates of the distribution of the expected marginal 
profitability of fertilizer use, given prevailing maize and fertilizer prices during the 
subsidy era. Finally, we correlate those results with spatially disaggregated estimates of 
headcount poverty rates so as to establish whether yield gains reasonably attributable to 
fertilizer subsidies accrue primarily in poorer or richer areas of the country.  
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We find that given 2009-2010 maize and fertilizer prices, the fertilizer bundle 
recommended under Malawi’s Agricultural Input Subsidy Program is almost always and 
everywhere profitable in expectation. Indeed, fertilizer use would remain profitable in 
expectation even in the face of significant fertilizer price increases and drought year 
conditions. While the program does appear to favorably affect maize yields and farm 
profits, however, the spatial pattern of those gains is largely uncorrelated with headcount 
poverty rates, calling into question the extent to which Malawi’s fertilizer subsidies have 
been pro-poor. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AN EVALUATION OF A LOCALLY PROCURED FOOD AID 
EMERGENCY RELIEF RESPONSE PROJECT IN GUATEMALA1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in public sector demand for locally and 
regionally procured (LRP) food aid. In 2010, the LRP share of United Nations World Food 
Programme (WFP) deliveries reached 67 percent, up from 11 percent as recently as 1999 (WFP 
2011a), as various donor governments have shifted from food aid based on commodities they 
ship to cash-based food assistance (Barrett et al. 2011). Similar changes have occurred in the 
United States, the world’s largest food aid donor. In the fiscal year 2008, new legislation 
authorized the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to begin using LRP under a 4-
year pilot project for $60 million. The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) also received over $240 million in fiscal year 2010 and $230 million in fiscal year 
2011 in supplemental appropriations under the Emergency Food Security Program, much of 
which has also been spent on LRP (US Agency for International Development 2012). Thus, by 
2010, in terms of volume, the US was not only the largest donor of food aid produced and 
sourced from the donor country but also the largest donor of locally and regionally (i.e., 
“triangular transactions”) procured food aid (WFP FAIS 2012). As LRP has grown, the use of 
other food assistance instruments – such as cash and voucher distributions – has likewise !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This chapter was written by Aurélie P. Harou, Miguel I. Gómez, Christopher B. Barrett, Erin C. 
Lentz and Teevrat Garg. The results from this chapter were combined with results from a similar 
study that took place in Burkina Faso to create the following published paper: 
 
Harou A and Upton J, Gomez M, Barrett C and Lentz E (2013). “Trade-offs or synergies? 
Assessing local and regional procurement through case studies in Burkina Faso and 
Guatemala”, World Development, 49(9): 44-57. 
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expanded, sparking the development of various response analysis tools to help agencies identify 
the best form of assistance to use in a given context (Barrett et al. 2009).  
The primary objective of food aid today is to help food insecure households combat 
chronic and/or acute malnutrition and food insecurity, whether caused by economic shocks, 
catastrophic weather events, political unrest or chronic poverty. Food aid can serve as a safety 
net to help vulnerable households smooth consumption and preserve assets in desperate times, 
helping them avoid poverty traps (Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007, Barrett and Maxwell 2005). 
LRP and the host of new tools associated with it, however, have also triggered an interest in 
using LRP to stimulate growth through agricultural development and promoting smallholder 
market accessibility. Most notably, the WFP's Purchase for Progress (P4P) five-year $140 
million pilot project committed to purchase food aid from smallholders and farmer based 
organizations (FBOs) in 21 countries (http://www.wfp.org/purchase-progress) (Mitchell and 
Leturque 2011). 
Despite the increased use of and funds dedicated to LRP, limited rigorous evidence exists 
on its impacts and on the potential benefits and drawbacks across the range of stated objectives, 
especially relative to transoceanic food aid delivery. Some evidence suggests that LRP, whether 
in-kind or through cash or vouchers, may reduce delivery time and costs. For example, Lentz and 
Barrett (2008) find that the median transoceanic food aid delivery in Eastern Africa was 21 
percent more expensive than local procurement during the same calendar quarter. Tschirley and 
del Castillo (2007) find cost savings of between 23 and 46 percent when procuring maize in 
Kenya, Uganda and Zambia relative to distributing US maize, taking into account delivery costs. 
Some studies examine the effects and additional costs of tied food aid. A report by the OECD 
(2005) finds that tied food aid costs at least 30 % more than untied food aid. More specifically, 
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Bageant et al. (2010) calculate that the US’ agricultural cargo preference requirement costs US 
taxpayers an estimated $140 million in 2006, representing approximately a 46% increase over 
competitive freight costs. Additionally, there is some evidence that cost savings may be even 
higher for cash and vouchers than for in-kind LRP, although the adoption of any new distribution 
mechanism entails learning costs for food aid agencies (Upton and Lentz 2011).  
Closely related to studies of cost savings are studies of time savings of delivery for food 
sourced closer to recipients. Replicating earlier findings from Barrett and Maxwell (2005), a 
study by the US Government Accountability Office (2009) finds that food coming directly from 
the US required on average 147 days to reach its destination compared to 35 days on average for 
locally procured food and 41 days for regionally procured food. The increased use of 
prepositioning of food aid, where in-kind food aid is stored in donor countries or in regions with 
high historic food aid demands, has helped diminish the time needed to deliver traditional food 
aid. These time savings come at a price, however, as donors can bear significant extra storage 
and transshipment costs (USGAO 2009).  
It has also been suggested that LRP can improve farmer profitability and stimulate local 
and regional markets, though little rigorous evidence exists to date that the authors are aware of 
to support such claims (Upton and Lentz 2011). Because the WFP's P4P pilot is still in progress, 
its full impacts are as yet unknown, though a midterm evaluation suggests an average income 
gain of $25 per farmer from participating in P4P in Africa (Mitchell and Leturque 2011). Farmer 
profitability and market stimulus of course depend not only on quantities purchased but also on 
commodity prices. The potential risk that the demand stimulus of LRP may increase market 
prices in procurement regions, rendering poor consumer households food insecure, has been a 
key concern and criticism against LRP. LRP can also have supply-side effects akin to traditional, 
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transoceanic food aid shipments, possibly decreasing prices in distribution markets. Garg et al. 
(2012) estimate price effects of LRP in distribution, procurement and adjacent markets, while 
controlling for possible confounding factors. They find that few LRP activities are statistically or 
economically significantly correlated with market prices or market price volatility, which, they 
explain, may in part result from the low quantities of goods procured relative to local market 
consumption and production.  
Contract default is a commonly cited concern about LRP (Hanrahan 2010, USDA 2009). 
For example, defaulting on contracts has been common under the WFP's P4P project; as of 
September 2011, 23 percent of P4P's contracts defaulted (WFP 2011b). Suppliers can default for 
any number of reasons, including lack of product available at the contracted price, difficulty 
meeting quality standards, opportunities to side-sell, and lack of affordable transportation. 
Therefore, supplier default, as discussed in detail later in this study, is an important risk faced by 
agencies undertaking LRP, particularly those agencies interested in procuring from small 
producers or traders. Thus, the cost and time savings associated with LRP must be weighed 
against the potential difficulty of finding local and regional suppliers who can supply the 
required volumes while meeting appropriate food safety and quality standards within the 
specified time-frame. 
This paper contributes to the literature by offering a comprehensive evaluation of the use 
of LRP by a private voluntary organization (PVO) that distributed food aid for a food emergency 
response project in Guatemala between August 2010 and September 2011. Our evaluation 
analyzes several dimensions of LRP. We a) compare the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of 
commodity delivery to the PVO warehouses relative to traditional food aid shipments from the 
US by the same donor to the same PVO; b) estimate the price impacts of local purchases and 
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distributions on local food markets; and c) examine recipient satisfaction with LRP commodities 
relative to commodities shipped from the US along multiple attributes. While some studies have 
compared recipients' preference of cash versus vouchers versus in-kind food aid (Michelson et 
al. 2012, Gentilini 2007, Meyer 2007, Ahmed 2005), to date there exists limited quantitative 
evidence regarding recipients' preferences of locally procured versus transoceanic foods. 
Additionally, there are few documented, publicly available case studies of directed procurement 
(i.e., semi-competitive tendering). Because the PVO was committed to offering smallholders the 
opportunity to sell to the PVO, it sought to procure food locally semi-competitively, by soliciting 
bids from local farmer based organizations (FBOs). However, the inability of the selected FBO 
to fulfill its contract and supply sufficient quantities at the agreed price required, mid-project, 
that the PVO procure competitively by soliciting bids nationally, illustrating the particular 
challenges associated with procuring from smallholders. Based on a comprehensive examination 
of the LRP project in Guatemala, the paper concludes with a discussion of tradeoffs that donors 
and PVOs should take into account when deciding among food aid modalities. 
 
2. Background 
Guatemala has both high levels of poverty and extreme inequality, with a poverty rate of 
51 percent, with approximately 70 percent of the poor living in rural areas, largely depending on 
agriculture for their livelihood (World Bank 2009). In addition to problems of chronic poverty, 
Guatemala's location between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean has made it vulnerable to 
violent tropical storms. Furthermore, its location on the Caribbean and North American tectonic 
plates makes mudslides, earthquakes and volcanoes a constant threat. 
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In 2009, Santa Rosa and other departments of the country's Dry Corridor2 suffered from 
droughts, adversely affecting harvests. The following year, the same region suffered from severe 
floods caused by Tropical Storm Agatha, ruining many crops for a second consecutive year. The 
international community responded with an inflow of aid, including the USDA-run Local and 
Regional Procurement Pilot Program (LRPPP), which granted funding to support an emergency 
food security project in five municipalities in Santa Rosa (Figure 1). The implementing PVO 
distributed locally-procured monthly rations of white maize, black beans and a locally made 
branded fortified corn soy blend (CSB) called Incaparina to 3,000 households during the months 
of October - December 2010, and April - September 2011.  
Meanwhile, the same PVO was running a Multi-year Assistance Program (MYAP) 
distributing comparable commodities (rice, pinto beans, CSB and vegetable oil) shipped from the 
US to communities in the department of Baja Verapaz, which suffered from high chronic rates of 
malnutrition. The simultaneous implementation of the LRPPP and MYAP projects in the same 
country by the same PVO enables us to conduct a rigorous evaluation, controlling for country-
and-PVO-specific and period-specific unobservables that routinely confound comparisons of 
LRP and in-kind food aid programs. The LRP and MYAP program objectives differed slightly, 
with the MYAP designed to reduce high rates of chronic malnutrition while the LRP aimed to 
relieve families whose harvests suffered from the 2009 droughts and 2010 floods. The 
commodities distributed and the ration sizes differed slightly between the projects.3 Because of 
these differences, there may remain differences in program characteristics that limit our ability to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The Dry Corridor is a strip of land that runs through several central and eastern departments of 
Guatemala, as well as a 6 km strip of land along the Pacific Coast. A Department is the 
Guatemalan political division unit equivalent to a State in the US or a Province in Canada. 
3 LRP recipients received 100 pounds of maize, 12 pounds of black beans and 13 pounds of 
Incaparina while MYAP recipients received 8 pounds of rice, 7 pounds of pinto beans, 10 
pounds of CSB and 14 pounds of vegetable oil. 
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identify observed differences in recipient satisfaction with food aid commodities as strictly 
attributable to local procurement versus transoceanic deliveries. Still, given the ethical and 
practical infeasibility of randomized assignment of food aid, and the extensive controls applied 
to carefully matched programs, we believe the inferences reported below are the best feasible 
and are highly informative. 
 
3. Timeliness analysis 
The timely arrival of food to the PVO distribution center is of upmost importance for 
households facing emergency food needs. We compare the timeliness of LRP relative to that of 
food aid shipped from the US. Following the methods described in Lentz et al. (2012) who 
compare timeliness across a range of countries, delivery lags were calculated based on the time 
that passed between the PVO’s initiation of the procurement and the delivery to the PVO’s final 
distribution warehouses. For transoceanic shipments, the lag is thus the difference between the 
release of an invitation for bids by the US government for commodity and ocean freight services 
for a USAID or USDA food aid program and the arrival at the PVO warehouse in the recipient 
country. For the LRP program, the PVO sought to procure maize and beans semi-competitively 
from smallholder FBOs and other vendors sourcing directly from smallholders (the PVO 
modified this strategy during the course of the program, as explained in section 7 below). 
Likewise, the PVO procured fortified CSB semi-competitively from a small number of food 
processors operating in the country. For all procurements, the time was calculated as the 
difference between the date the tender (i.e., invitation for bids) was released to prospective 
suppliers and the arrival at the PVO warehouse. 
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Transoceanic food aid shipments data to Guatemala were acquired from USDA and 
USAID. Dates of port arrival and arrival at final warehouses were acquired from three PVOs that 
received USAID or USDA food aid shipments in Guatemala during the time span of the LRP 
project. The LRP data were acquired from the implementing PVO. Commodities shipped from 
the US were not exactly the same commodities as those procured by the LRP program. 
Consequently, commodities from the US were chosen that most closely resembled the 
commodities purchased in Guatemala: LRP black beans were compared to MYAP pinto beans; 
LRP maize was compared to rice shipped from the US; and LRP Incaparina was compared to 
CSB. 
Table 1 shows the average number of weeks it took for commodities procured locally or 
shipped from the US to arrive at PVO warehouses. The LRP commodities consistently arrived to 
the distribution warehouses sooner than the food coming from the US. Time savings ranged from 
less than one week for CSB to over eight weeks for the cereals (LRP maize and US rice), a 
practically and statistically significant difference. Thus, we find evidence that LRP generates 
unambiguous timeliness gains relative to delivery of commodities from the US, even for a 
nearby recipient country with an ocean port, like Guatemala. This suggests that, when feasible, 
LRP may be preferred to transoceanic food aid in emergency relief situations that require an 
immediate response. 
 
4. Cost analysis 
Cost considerations are an important part of comparing LRP with other food aid 
procurement mechanisms. Given tightly constrained budgetary resources, cost savings can result 
in projects reaching more vulnerable families, improving rations, or both. Following the 
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methodology described in more detail in Lentz et al.’s (2012) multi-country comparative study, 
we compare the costs of purchasing food from the US to the costs associated with the 
Guatemalan LRP. The analysis includes the costs of the commodity, ocean freight, and internal 
transport, storage and handling (commonly referred to as ITSH). Commodities from the US were 
chosen that most closely resembled the commodities purchased in Guatemala, as explained 
above. However, LRP maize and transoceanic rice were deemed too dissimilar for comparison in 
terms of cost efficiency due to the differences in commodity characteristics, including taste, 
texture and color. 
USDA and the USAID provided the data for the commodity and ocean freight costs for 
the commodities coming from the US. The three PVOs that received CSB or pinto beans from 
the US during the course of the LP project provided the associated ITSH costs. The costs of LRP 
were obtained from the implementing PVO. Local suppliers delivered the commodities to the 
PVO warehouses and thus combined ITSH costs and commodity costs in their bids. Accounting 
practices for administrative costs vary widely across PVOs, so since we use data from multiple 
PVOs in these comparisons, we exclude administrative costs from this analysis.4 
Table 2 reports the cost comparisons in US dollars per metric ton of food aid distributed. 
The analysis suggests that the Guatemalan LRP was more expensive than transoceanic food aid. 
The difference in average costs of beans procurement in favor of the US-sourced commodities is 
small (9 percent) and not statistically significant. However, the costs for the locally-procured 
fortified CSB, Incaparina, were much higher than for the CSB purchased in and shipped from the 
US. Part of this difference can be explained by the differences in the two products. The CSB !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Calculating dollars spent per gram of micronutrient is an alternative costing approach. We do 
not have detailed micronutrient information on the locally sourced food and therefore are 
unable to compute this comparison. However, this is an interesting avenue for future research 
and we thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion. 
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procured in Guatemala was a branded product sold in small (450 gram) retail bags whereas the 
CSB from the US arrived to warehouses in 25-pound bags. Additionally, the CSB made in 
Guatemala was fortified with higher quantities of vitamins A, B1, B2, B12, folic acid, niacin, 
iron and zinc than US-sourced CSB. CSB more comparable to the CSB coming from the US can 
be found in Guatemala, but the PVO chose to distribute a highly fortified CSB regularly 
consumed by local customers. Whether the higher costs of locally-procured CSB are warranted 
depends on the quality, nutritional content and preferences of recipients and the tradeoffs the 
PVO and donor are willing to make for such objectives. A thorough quality and nutritional study 
was not conducted in this evaluation, although higher quantities of vitamins and minerals 
presumably have greater nutritional benefits.  
 
5. Price analysis 
Economic theory predicts that LRP could potentially disrupt source and/or recipient 
markets. Procurement in a market causes a demand increase, potentially increasing prices, while 
distributions – whether sourced locally or in the donor country – generate a supply shock, 
possibly decreasing prices. If the procurement and distribution regions are the same, as in the 
Guatemala case5, the overall effect may be entirely attenuated because LRP affect prices in 
opposite directions. Furthermore, the shift in demand or supply and thus the level of price 
change, if any, are affected by the quantities procured relative to the markets' average production 
(supply), the level of market integration into national and global markets, and the elasticity of 
demand and supply of the procured and substitute goods. Thus, LRP is likely to have little effect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Procurement and distribution occurred in Santa Rosa, a department that is geographically and 
agriculturally diverse. Thus, while the drought and subsequent flooding affected certain 
regions, other regions within the same department were unharmed. 
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on prices if the quantities procured are small and/or if local and regional markets are well-
integrated, since adjustments may occur entirely through trade flows instead of price 
fluctuations. 
While price increases are desirable for producers, many smallholder producers are net 
consumers (Barrett 2008) so that price increases are likely to increase the number of food 
insecure households, highlighting the importance for monitoring and evaluating the effect of 
LRP on prices. We estimate whether LRP had any impact on retail market price levels and price 
volatility. These effects are estimated both across time, by assessing LRP's effect on prices up to 
two or three months after the purchase, and across space by assessing the effect of LRP not just 
in the procurement-and-distribution department (Santa Rosa) but also in other markets in 
Guatemala. Inter-temporal price effects may occur because of induced changes in storage 
behavior or delayed adjustments associated with temporary disequilibrium in response to shocks. 
Prices are jointly determined by any factor that affects demand and supply in local, national and 
international markets. As is explained in detail below, we control for possible confounding 
factors (e.g., rainfall, temperature and fuel costs) to better isolate the relationship between LRP 
and prices.  
The framework and econometric strategy is adapted from Tadesse and Shively (2009) 
and is explained in further detail in Garg et al. (2012), whose approach we almost exactly follow 
(the lone methodological deviation is noted below). Briefly, we estimate LRP price impacts 
using the following model, 
 
 pcit = α + β′pcit-k + λ′LRPcit-d + δ′Xit +ψ ci +εcit    (1) 
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where p represents the natural logarithm of market prices (in quetzals per metric ton) of 
commodity c at time t in spatial market i. β represents the vector of k autoregressive coefficients 
needed to eliminate serial correlation in prices and λ is a vector that captures contemporaneous 
and up to the dth-period lagged impacts of LRP activity on prices (optimal distributed lag 
structures were chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion). X includes controls for possibly 
confounding variables and shocks, including rainfall and temperature – both expressed as 
standard deviations from long-term monthly means – inflation, world market prices, domestic 
transport costs, seasonality dummies and food aid quantities procured by WFP in Guatemala and 
in neighboring countries, as well as market fixed effects, ψc, to control for time invariant 
unobservable spatial price differences. The maximum likelihood estimates of λ, the parameter of 
interest, are consistent as long as the series are stationary and there is no serial correlation in the 
residuals (Hamilton 1994). The coefficient estimate on lagged prices will be biased given the 
fixed effects framework, so – unlike Garg et al. (2012) – we instrument lagged prices using 
twice-lagged prices (e.g., replacing pcit-1 with pcit-2) by including the instrument in place of the 
lagged price in equation (1). 
The absolute value of the residuals from equation (1) can be used to study price volatility 
– expressed as the conditional standard deviation of the natural logarithm of price – by 
estimating an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model using the same regressors as 
in equation (1), just replacing lagged prices with lagged absolute values of residuals. For more 
details on the estimation strategy, please refer to the multi-country comparative study by Garg et 
al. (2012).  
This method is applied to monthly retail price data for white and yellow maize, 
Incaparina (the locally-procured CSB) and black beans collected between January 2000 and 
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November 2011 by the Guatemalan National Statistical Office (INE). The INE price data 
available were organized by region, eight in total, representing 22 of the 23 departments in 
Guatemala, as shown in Table 3. The data used to control for possible confounding factors come 
from a variety of sources. Monthly temperature and rainfall data were obtained from the Instituto 
Nacional de Sismología, Vulcanología, Meteorología, e Hidrología (INSIVUMEH) from 
December 2000 - December 2010. For January 2011 – April 2011, monthly temperature and 
rainfall data were averaged using data from the Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN) 
in Belize, Honduras and El Salvador. Exchange and inflation rates were obtained from the World 
Bank’s Global Economic Monitor. Transport costs were obtained from INE. USDA black bean 
prices were used as a proxy for world bean prices. World prices for maize were obtained from 
the World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor Commodity Databank.6 The World Food Program 
provided WFP monthly procurement quantities in Guatemala and in neighboring countries. 
Three sets of regressions are run to study LRP correlations with prices and price 
volatility, for both procurement and distribution: a) the correlation of LRP with prices in all 
departments nationwide for which data were available, b) the LRP-price conditional correlation 
within the procurement-and-distribution markets of Santa Rosa, and c) the LRP-price conditional 
correlation in all departments outside of Santa Rosa, in order to get a sense of whether LRP has 
spatial spillover effects in other markets. The estimated percentage price effects of LRP are 
shown in Table 4.7 
We find no evidence that LRP has an economically or statistically significant relationship 
with retail food prices within Guatemala. As one would expect, the point estimates were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 We use those US gulf ports maize prices as world market price controls in the price and price 
volatility regressions for white maize and Incaparina as well as for yellow maize. 
7 Full regressions results are shown in the Appendix, tables A1-A12. 
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routinely greater in magnitude in Santa Rosa, where procurement and distribution occurred, than 
in markets outside the LRP zone. However, none of the estimated price effects were statistically 
significantly different from zero at the five percent level, within the Department of Santa Rosa, 
much less in other markets outside the LRP project zone, or nationwide. Moreover, the point 
estimates were all small in magnitude and/or negative, suggesting that the food distribution 
(supply-side) effect common to all direct food distribution or monetization programs dominates 
the procurement (demand-side) effect unique to local procurement programs. The only series for 
which the point estimate is positive and of non-negligible magnitude was for beans in Santa Rosa 
during the procurement month, with an estimated effect of just under seven percent, which is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Table 4 also reports the estimated correlation between LRP and price volatility. There is 
no evidence that PVO local purchases of beans, maize and Incaparina in Guatemala had an 
economically meaningful relationship with food price volatility in local markets. The only 
statistically significant point estimates were for Incaparina in markets outside of Santa Rosa, 
where LRP procurement activity is associated with less price volatility. However, the magnitude 
of this effect is small, as the estimated reduction in price volatility was less than one percent.  
As noted above, the Guatemalan LRP was a relatively small pilot program. It is possible 
that larger purchases might have greater price effects. Indeed, the results indicate that WFP's far 
larger LRP of Incaparina in neighboring countries – WFP procured 675 MT/months, on average, 
in neighboring countries versus just 24 MT by the PVO whose program we study – were 
associated with statistically significant price decreases of 0.145 percent in Guatemala (p<0.10). 
Likewise, the much larger WFP LRP of beans in Guatemala– average monthly procurement of 
216 MT versus 22 MT for the focal PVO – were statistically significantly negatively associated 
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with retail bean prices in the country8, but only by -0.632 percent. But even these market price 
correlations are economically unimportant, suggesting that it would likely be feasible to 
implement LRP at a larger scale in Guatemala than under the LRPPP without causing market 
disruptions. 
 
6. Recipient satisfaction analysis 
Food aid recipients in the LRP and MYAP regions were surveyed to elicit how satisfied 
they were with different attributes of the commodities they received and how expensive and time 
intensive it was for them to prepare meals with these commodities. Analyzing recipient 
satisfaction and the costliness to recipients of preparation is important for at least two reasons. 
First, recipients who are satisfied with the commodities they receive may be more likely to 
consume them. Thus, if a program objective is to reduce malnutrition and hunger, that objective 
will more likely be met by commodities that satisfy recipients. Conversely, recipients who are 
more satisfied with the foods they receive are less likely to waste them or to find other uses for 
the commodities, for example, as livestock feed, in alcohol brewing, or to sell in the market. 
Second, the overall wellbeing of the recipients increases the greater their satisfaction with the 
commodities received and the fewer the required preparation inputs (e.g., fuel, water, time). 
As mentioned, the simultaneous distribution of LRP commodities to one group of 
recipients and of US-sourced commodities to another group by the same PVO provides a natural 
experiment for more rigorous identification of impacts directly attributable to the local sourcing 
of commodities. A subset of municipios (or municipalities), and communities within the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!Percent price and price volatility associations with WFP LRP were calculated in the same way 
as correlations of the PVO LRP listed in Table 3. Full regression results are shown in the 
Appendix, tables A1-A12.!
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municipios, was selected in each department to participate in the LRP and MYAP projects by the 
PVO's local partner organization based on the needs of the department and discussions with local 
community leaders. Five municipios participated in the LRP program, while three participated in 
the MYAP program. In the LRP communities, recipient households were selected based on the 
PVO's Household Food Insecurity Access Study, a short questionnaire designed to distinguish 
food insecure from food secure households. Rations were distributed freely to the most 
vulnerable families and distributed conditionally to other targeted families in exchange for 
working on community projects, such as improving local roads or bridges, building irrigation 
systems, and working on conservation projects, among others. At the time of the surveying, the 
MYAP project in Baja Verapaz was approaching its fifth and final year. Families receiving food 
aid were those with children under the age of three and/or pregnant mothers. Therefore, families 
supported in the MYAP project changed over time. These targeting differences are controlled for 
based on household composition in the multivariate regression analysis below. 
In order to obtain a representative sample, a random sample of recipient families was 
generated by stratifying participating municipalities. Villages were randomly sampled within 
each municipality depending on the number of recipient families in each municipality. Because 
the families receiving aid changed over time in the MYAP region, only those families who had 
received at least two rations and were still receiving food at the time of the survey were 
randomly selected. A total of eight villages were sampled in each department and at least 15 
households were surveyed in each community, yielding a total of 120 recipient survey 
respondents in Baja Verapaz and 121 in Santa Rosa. The surveys were conducted in July 2011 
within a two-week period. The person in charge of cooking the majority of the meals was asked 
to answer the survey questions. 
! 34!
Recipients were asked to rate several attributes of the commodities they received on a 
Likert scale from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). These attributes included perceived 
quality, quantity, taste, storability, time to cook, texture/appearance, perceived nutritional content 
and cleanliness. The recipients also rated their overall satisfaction with the commodities. 
Recipients were also asked to rate their satisfaction with the received commodity relative to the 
product that most resembled the distributed good that the respondent had either purchased in the 
local market or produced at home. Recipients were asked how much they preferred the received 
commodity to its locally available equivalent commodity on a scale from much less (1) to much 
more (5). However, because the majority of responses responded 4 (satisfied) or (more) and 5 
(very satisfied) or (much more) in both sets of questions, responses were regrouped into three 
categories in the analysis that follows: 1 (very unsatisfied, unsatisfied or the same) or (much less, 
less or the same), 2 (satisfied) or (more) and 3 (very satisfied) or (much more).  
We employ an ordered logit specification to explain the differences in ordinal preferences 
between the commodities received as a function of the origin of the product (LRP versus 
transoceanic), while controlling for other factors that may affect preferences: 
y*ij = β0 + β1LRPij + β2′ Xij + β3′ Zj  + εij + ηj   (2) 
yij = 1 if y*ij ≤ µ1 
    yij = 2 if µ1 < y*ij ≤ µ2 
    yij = 3 if µ2 < y*ij 
where y*ij represents the latent continuous response of recipient i in community j to a specific 
ranking question, which is grouped into one of the observed ordinal responses, yij, according to 
where y*ij falls relative to unobserved cut-off points µk (for k = 1,2). The parameter β0 is a 
constant, LRP is an indicator variable taking value one for the LRP project region and zero in the 
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control region (the MYAP region), Xij is a matrix of household specific controls and Zj is a 
matrix of community-level controls. Household-level controls include the age of the respondent, 
the education level of the respondent, the primary language spoken at home, the number of 
household members between 18 and 60 years old, the total number of household members, 
whether the respondent is the head of the household, the gender of the household head, the age of 
the household head, the education level of the household head and the number of monthly rations 
received by the recipients. The community-level controls include whether the local market 
occurs either two or three times a week, if access to the market requires walking, if part of the 
road to access the market is dirt, distance to the market (in km), the average time needed to travel 
to the market (in minutes), and whether any part of the path to the market is inaccessible at any 
time of the year. The ration sizes were constant and did not vary over time.  
In equation (2), β1 is the coefficient of interest, reflecting how receiving LRP 
commodities, rather than food aid commodities shipped from the United States, affects recipient 
satisfaction, after controlling for other factors that might influence preferences and might be 
correlated with inclusion in the LRP program. Since assignment to the LRP program was 
exogenous to recipients and selection was unrelated to recipient satisfaction with the 
commodities, β1 can be interpreted as the causal effect of local sourcing on recipient satisfaction 
with rations. The coefficient vectors β2  and β3 reflect the effects of the control vectors Xij and Zj, 
respectively. The error term can be decomposed into two components, ε and η, which include 
household- and community-specific unobservable characteristics, respectively. A random effects 
model is estimated to capture community-specific unobserved variables and to allow them to 
vary between households within a cluster. 
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Table 5 defines the control variables more precisely and offers descriptive statistics. 
Generally, the population in the LRP community is older than in the MYAP region. A'chi, one of 
the 23 Mayan languages spoken in Guatemala, is the primary language spoken by the majority of 
recipients in Baja Verapaz, while it is Spanish for recipients in Santa Rosa. Respondents were all 
female in both regions and most often the wife of the head of the household, although 20 percent 
of respondents in Santa Rosa said they were the head of household compared to 6 percent in Baja 
Verapaz. The education level of both regions is comparable, with 40-45 percent of respondents 
having received no education and 17-19 percent having completed the elementary education. 
Recipients in both regions consumed all or the majority of the food rations they received. 
Those who did not consume all of the rations received gave some to their friends and/or family. 
Histograms of the recipients' responses reveal that recipients in both the LRP and MYAP zones 
were generally satisfied with the commodities they received.9 LRP recipients more frequently 
responded that they were very satisfied than respondents in the MYAP region, as reflected in 
bivariate Mann Whitney test results indicating a statistically significantly higher median 
response from LRP recipients than from MYAP recipients across most attributes and 
commodities (Table 6).  
A summary of the ordered logit results is shown in Table 6. 10 Note that ordered logit 
coefficient estimates are not directly interpretable; they only make sense at specific values of 
variables. What can be unambiguously interpreted are the signs and statistical significance levels 
of coefficient estimates. The results again indicate that Guatemalan food aid recipients prefer 
locally sourced commodities along most criteria, especially for beans, with the exception of 
recipients' perceptions of the nutritional content for rice versus maize. When we do the same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 These are available from the contact author by request. 10!Full regression results are found in the Appendix, tables A13-A21.!
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estimation using respondents’ satisfaction with the food aid ration relative to the product 
available on the local market, the results are qualitatively identical; locally-sourced commodities 
are statistically significantly more preferred along most attributes (Table 7). 
Recipients were also asked to assess, on a scale from 1 (much more) to 5 (much less), the 
preparation costs they incurred for the commodity they received from the PVO relative to the 
one they would otherwise purchase or produce, as described above. Table 8 reports the bivariate 
Mann Whitney test results, which show that LRP commodities required statistically significantly 
less fuel use, time, water use, cooking oil use, expense and effort than the MYAP commodities. 
Again, responses were regrouped into three categories for multivariate ordered logit 
random effects estimation. The estimation results suggest that the locally-sourced commodities 
required fewer inputs to prepare than did the US-sourced commodities. More specifically, LRP 
beans required statistically significantly less fuel, time, water, and effort to cook and LRP maize 
required less preparation time. The US-sourced CSB, on the other hand, required statistically 
significantly less time than did the locally-sourced Incaparina. The comparison to cooking oil use 
is not shown for maize/rice and Incaparina/CSB because the majority of respondents from both 
the LRP and MYAP regions did not use oil to prepare these commodities for consumption. 
 
7. Procurement case study 
Some donors and agencies have seen LRP as an opportunity not only to source relief food 
faster or more cheaply, but also as a means to encourage smallholder production and market 
access in the country where aid is procured. Toward that end, in 2010, 14 percent of the WFP’s 
purchases made in the 21 pilot P4P countries were made from smallholders (WFP 2011b). With 
the same development objective in mind, the PVO in Guatemala sought to procure from 
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smallholder producers by soliciting bids from local FBOs of small farmers and other 
smallholder-sourcing vendors, rather than throwing the competition open to agribusinesses 
without regard to where they sourced their products. 
Survey instruments were designed to test whether PVO purchases led to a shift in 
smallholders' production choices and quantities and whether the purchases led to the adoption of 
improved management practices and/or investments to ensure better quality. However, in trying 
to survey farmers who the selected FBO managers claimed supplied the LRP products, the 
research team discovered many ghost suppliers. It turned out that the FBO heavily supplemented 
their smallholder sourcing with commodities produced outside of the FBO, reputedly due to the 
smallholders’ inability to produce the quantities required. Few of the sampled farmers had in fact 
supplied the FBO, so the survey was halted. 
Finding FBOs and vendors to invite to bid was a challenge for the PVO. Ultimately, only 
24/42 (57 percent) of the invited FBOs submitted bids. From conversations with key informants 
and FBO leaders, likely reasons for the low response rate include the difficulty for FBOs and 
smaller commercial vendors to understand the content and terms in the call for bids, the 
difficulty in supplying relatively large quantities, the difficulty in abiding by the quality 
standards, the difficulty in being responsible for the transport of the goods, the high risks 
associated with possible rejection of the goods, and the delayed (two weeks after delivery) 
payment under the contract terms.  
A common concern in semi-competitive tendering surrounds suppliers’ capacity to satisfy 
quality standards with products sourced from nontraditional commercial suppliers relying on 
smallholder producers. Upon delivery of the commodity to the PVO warehouse, the goods were 
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tested to ensure they met commodity-specific quality standards.11  Samples were also extracted 
during the delivery and sent to a lab to test for possible aflatoxin contamination. Ultimately, a 
total of 260 quintals of maize failed humidity tests during the May and July procurements. 
Following unprecedented domestic maize price increases beginning in January 2011, the 
FBO maize and beans supplier from the third tender agreed only to sign a maize contract up to 
two months at a time despite the fact that tender specifications asked for a six month contract. It 
was later discovered that this FBO was supplying goods not produced by its members, breaching 
the terms of their contract. The right of the PVO to invoke the terms of the contract legally 
presented two problems: the additional costs and time needed for legal action and the financial 
and reputational harm it would cause to the FBO. Instead, the PVO terminated the contract 
amicably and procured the remaining distributions competitively. It decided to procure 
competitively given the difficulty of finding maize in Guatemala during June-July 2011, 
especially from smallholders. After the competitive tender was announced, 14-16 suppliers 
requested the tendering details and three prospective suppliers submitted bids. 
Table 9 shows the prices and quantities by commodity offered by different bidders over 
the course of the LRP project. Prices rose for all three commodities between October 2010-
September 2011: from 350 quetzals per quintal (Qz/Q) to 450 Qz/Q for beans, from 160 Qz/Q to 
265 Qz/Q for maize, and from 5.39 Qz/bag to 6.9 Qz/Q for CSB. This presented a challenge for 
the PVO, which had a fixed budget to manage. Market prices far exceeded past trends for maize, 
where prices at the same time one year earlier reached a maximum at 141 Qz/Q (FAO 2010). 
However, the winners were not necessarily those that offered the lowest prices. Indeed, the PVO 
and its partner organization reviewed the offers and allocated points to each offer based on price, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The quality standards for beans, maize and fortified CSB are available from the contact author 
in Tables A22-A23.!
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the suppliers' experience with supplying other PVOs and the bidders’ mandate to support local 
smallholders. 
The PVO's experience procuring from smallholders highlights some very real challenges 
for LRPs. Substantial time is needed to identify potential suppliers. Government or donor 
agencies or other PVOs may be able to provide lists of organizations working within a region. 
But the certified organizations will not necessarily be able to respond to the contract 
specifications (e.g., quality standards and procurement volumes sought). Smallholders may take 
additional risks by deciding to invest in technology to improve production of the commodities 
purchased by the PVO if they expect the demand for the good to grow or subsist in subsequent 
seasons. Furthermore, if PVOs purchase directly from producers, traders may be forced out of 
the market, diminishing their welfare. Should the buyer no longer purchase locally or directly 
from producers in subsequent seasons, traders would incur additional costs if they deemed it 
profitable to re-enter, potentially asking producers a higher price premium to account for the 
trader’s newly acquired risk of loosing their livelihood when PVOs decide to buy directly from 
producers. Unexpected price changes or yield shocks may make it difficult for FBOs to honor 
their contracts and for the PVO to purchase locally given a fixed budget. While contracts may be 
signed between the PVO and FBO, legal recourse may prove too time-consuming and costly to 
seek restitution in the event of breach of contract. These prospective complications must be 
weighed against the potential development gains of contracting with smallholders, especially in 
the context of an emergency food aid program with immediate objectives of relieving acutely 
food insecure households. 
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8. Conclusions 
The nuanced results of this in-depth case study highlight the importance of carefully 
considering the objectives of a food assistance intervention and the context in which it might be 
undertaken when deciding whether to procure rations locally. LRP does appear to be preferred 
when time is of the essence, such as in emergency response relief situations. But in the 2010-11 
Guatemala case, LRP entailed higher costs of distributing food aid. Those higher costs must also 
be considered with the quality and nutritional content of the commodities as well as with 
recipients' preferences, which clearly favored locally-sourced products. In this case – and we 
suspect in other contexts as well – some tradeoffs are inevitable. These should be confronted 
explicitly in the decision of whether to pursue local procurement and, if so, whether to source 
competitively or semi-competitively, with the intent of using the agency’s local market demand 
to benefit smallholder producers and groups.  
Monitoring prices is crucial to determine both when local procurement is viable and 
whether LRP has any effect on price levels and their volatility. The results of this study indicate 
that the small quantities procured had little effect on prices or price volatility in the 
procurement/distribution market or in other markets nationwide. Further, although the larger 
volumes procured by parallel LRP programs appear to have had a statistically significant 
correlation with price levels, the magnitude of such effect is too modest to be relevant in 
economic terms.  
Finally, the case study of the PVO’s experience procuring from smallholders highlighted 
several challenges. The mechanism by which a PVO decides to procure food locally and 
regionally, whether through competitive or semi-competitive tendering, must be carefully 
considered, especially with respect to the primary objectives of the intervention, the relief of 
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targeted food recipients. While there may well be situations in which local sourcing of food aid 
generates synergies between smallholder gains and recipient preferences (Upton et al. 2012), the 
Guatemala case underscores that such synergies are by no means guaranteed. The attempt to 
support smallholder agriculture should not be made at the expense of the food insecure in food 
aid programs justified on humanitarian grounds. 
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10. Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: LRP and MYAP departments and municipalities
1
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11. Tables 
  
Table 1: Timeliness of Food Aid Deliveries (weeks)
LRP Food Shipped from US Di↵erence
Commodity 1 Maize (5) Rice (3)
Time to delivery 8.51 17.24 8.73*
Commodity 2 Black Beans (9) Pinto Beans (4)
Time to delivery 10.12 16.43 6.31*
Commodity 3 Incaparina (6) CSB (3)
Time to delivery 16.81 17.42 0.61
Commodity 4 - Vegetable Oil (3)
Time to delivery 23.05
Cross Commodity average 12.72 18.37 5.65*
* indicates statistical significance of a two-tailed t-test at the 10 % level
Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations.
Table 2: Cost of Delivered Commodities (USD/Metric Ton)
Transoceanic LRP Transoceanic LRP
Commodity CSB (2) Incaparina (9) Pinto Beans (3) Beans (6)
Commodity Cost $616.76 $1,919.03 $739.14 $1,087.25
Ocean Freight Rate $177.06 - $189.56 -
ITSH $73.41 - $70.60 -
Total $867.23 $1,919.03 $999.30 $1,087.25
Cost Savings -121% *** -9%
*** indicates statistical significance of a two-tailed t-test at the 1 % level.
Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations.
3
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Table 3: Monthly price data, by region
No. Region Departments
1 Metropolitana Guatemala
2 North Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz
3 Northeast Izabal Chiquimula, Zacapa, El Progreso
4 Southeast Jutiapa, Jalapa, Santa Rosa
5 Central Chimaltenango, Sacatepe´quez, Escuintla
6 Southwest San Marcos, Quetzaltenango, Totonicapa´n,
Solola´, Retalhuleu, Suchitepe´quez
7 Northwest Huehuetenago, Quiche´
8 Pete´n Pete´n
Table 4: Estimated % Retail Price and Price Volatility E↵ects of LP
Commodity Time All Markets Santa Rosa Not Santa Rosa
Price P Volatility Price P Volatility Price P Volatility
Beans Immediate 1.796 -0.638 6.986* -0.810 1.083 -0.312
(1.234) (0.788) (4.019) (3.292) (1.268) (0.794)
1 month lag -0.026 -0.035 -3.468 -0.550 0.523 -0.264
(1.411) (0.835) (4.637) (6.981) (1.450) (0.837)
Incaparina Immediate 0.542 -0.607 ** -1.061 1.088 -0.470 -0.892**
(0.390) (0.259) (1.163) (1.065) (0.411) (0.452)
1 month lag -0.810 -0.127 -2.033 -0.488 -0.627 0.610
(0.444) (0.532) (1.316) (1.911) (0.470) (2.952)
White Maize Immediate -5.291 2.855 -3.009 2.152 -5.564 2.613
(5.499) (5.900) (3.424) (2.699) (6.257) (6.744)
1 month lag -8.971 0.677 -4.456 -1.544 -9.544 0.469
(6.080) (6.708) (3.680) (2.763) (6.927) (7.680)
Yellow Maize Immediate -6.560 3.904 -6.049 4.912 -5.916 3.499
(6.573) (7.289) (7.802) (11.661) (7.372) (8.080)
1 month lag -8.403 1.132 -8.405 -0.172 -7.637 2.202
(7.328) (8.325) (8.889) (21.15) (8.190) (9.242)
NOTES: (1) ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. (2) Percent change are calculated based on equations (2) and
(5) in Garg et al (2012) and are calculated at the PVO’s average procurement volume.
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(5) in Garg et al (2012) and are calculated at the PVO’s average procurement volume. (3) We instrument
lagged prices using twice-lagged prices.
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Table 6: General Satisfaction
Beans Maize/Rice Fortified
CSB/CSB
Mann Whitney Results:
Quality LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Quantity LRP*** LRP ** LRP ***
Taste LRP*** LRP ** LRP ***
Storability LRP*** LRP * LRP
Time to cook LRP*** LRP ** LRP
Texture/Appearance LRP*** LRP *** LRP **
Nutritional content LRP LRP *** LRP ***
Cleanliness LRP*** LRP *** LRP *
General Satisfaction LRP*** LRP ** LRP **
Multivariate Ordered Logit Results:
Quality LRP LRP LRP***
Quantity LRP* MYAP LRP
Taste LRP*** LRP LRP
Storability LRP*** LRP*** LRP**
Cooking Time LRP*** LRP LRP
Appearance LRP** LRP*** LRP
Nutritional content LRP MYAP LRP
Cleanliness LRP* MYAP ** MYAP
General Satisfaction LRP*** LRP LRP
NOTES: (1) ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. (2)
The multivariate ordered logit results include the following controls: age, education, total household
members, distance to market (km), distance to the market (minutes), monthly rations received, language,
household members aged between 19-60, female head of household and market accessibility, market
frequency 2/week, market frequency 3/week, market accessed by foot and market access by dirt road.
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Table 7: Relative Satisfaction
Beans Maize/Rice Fortified
CSB/CSB
Mann Whitney Results:
Quality LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Taste LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Storability LRP*** LRP *** LRP***
Texture/Appearance LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Nutritional content LRP*** LRP *** LRP **
Cleanliness LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
General Satisfaction LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Multivariate Ordered Logit Results:
Quality LRP LRP*** MYAP*
Taste LRP** LRP MYAP
Storability LRP LRP* MYAP
Appearance MYAP LRP MYAP
Nutritional content MYAP MYAP *** MYAP
Cleanliness LRP LRP MYAP
General Satisfaction MYAP MYAP MYAP
NOTES: (1) ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. (2)
The multivariate ordered logit results include the following controls: age, education, total household
members, distance to market (km), distance to the market (minutes), monthly rations received, language,
household members aged between 19-60, female head of household and market accessibility, market
frequency 2/week, market frequency 3/week, market accessed by foot and market access by dirt road.
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Table 8: Preparation Costs
Beans Maize/Rice Fortified
CSB/CSB
Mann Whitney Results:
Fuel Use LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Time LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Water Use LRP*** LRP ** LRP***
Cooking Oil Use LRP*** - -
Cost LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
E↵ort LRP*** LRP *** LRP ***
Multivariate Ordered Logit Results:
Fuel Use LRP*** LRP* MYAP
Time LRP*** LRP MYAP
Water Use LRP MYAP LRP
Cost - MYAP MYAP
E↵ort MYAP LRP MYAP*
NOTES: (1) ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. (2)
The multivariate ordered logit results include the following controls: age, education, total household
members, distance to market (km), distance to the market (minutes), monthly rations received, language,
household members aged between 19-60, female head of household and market accessibility, market
frequency 2/week, market frequency 3/week, market accessed by foot and market access by dirt road.
7
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Table 9: O↵ers (prices and quantities)
Winner Date Year Org type Qty (1Q = 100
lbs)
Price Total Bid (Qz)
Beans:
* October-November 2010 Commercial 720 Q 350 Qz/Q 252,000
October-November 2010 Association 720 Q 475 Qz/Q 342,000
December 2010 Association 360 Q 400 Qz/Q 144,000
* December 2010 Commercial 360 Q 400 Qz/Q 144,000
* April-September 2011 Association 2,160 Q 400 Qz/Q 864,000
April-September 2011 Association 2,160 Q 420 Qz/Q 907,200
April-September 2011 Commercial 2,160 Q 450 Qz/Q 972,000
July-September 2011 Association 1,080 Q 420 Qz/Q 453,600
* July-September 2011 Commercial 1,080 Q 390 Qz/Q 421,200
July-September 2011 Commercial 1,080 Q 415 Qz/Q 448,200
Maize:
* October-November 2010 Commercial 6,000 Q 160 Qz/Q 960,000
October-November 2010 Association 6,000 Q 196 Qz/Q 245,784
* October-November 2010 Association 6000 Q 162 Qz/Q 972,000
* December 2010 Association 3000 Q 158 Qz/Q 474,000
December 2010 Commercial 3000 Q 160 Qz/Q 480,000
* April-September 2011 Association 18,000 Q 162 Qz/Q 2,916,000
April-September 2011 Association 18,000 Q 164 Qz/Q 2,952,000
April-September 2011 Commercial 18,000 Q 170 Qz/Q 3,060,000
April-September 2011 Commercial 18,000 Q 180 Qz/Q 3,240,000
* June 2011 Association 3,000 Q 185 Qz/Q 555,000
July-September 2011 Association 9,000 Q 250 Qz/Q 2,250,000
* July-September 2011 Commercial 9,000 Q 265 Qz/Q 2,385,000
July-September 2011 Commercial 9,000 Q 250 Qz/Q 2,250,000
CSB:
October-November 2010 Commercial 78,622 bags 5.39 Qz/bag 423,773
* October-November 2010 Commercial 78,622 bags 6.50 Qz/bag 511,043
October-November 2010 Association 78,622 bags 6.75 Qz/bag 530,699
* December 2010 Commercial 39,000 bags 6.50 Qz/bag 253,500
* April-September 2011 Commercial 234,000 bags 6.90 Qz/bag 1,614,600
April-September 2011 Commercial 234,000 bags 6.29 Qz/bag 1,471,860
NOTES: * indicates the winner of the bid.
8
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Table A-1: All Market E↵ects: Beans (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.950***
(0.0326)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0686**
(0.0321)
Procurement current 0.000765 -0.000237
(0.000573) (0.000362)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000742 -2.41e-05
(0.000630) (0.000399)
Procurement lag 2 0.000892 0.000176
(0.000611) (0.000387)
Log world prices current 0.0569** 0.0170
(0.0287) (0.0188)
Log world prices lag 1 -0.00776 -0.0416
(0.0461) (0.0300)
Log world prices lag 2 -0.0244 0.0209
(0.0283) (0.0181)
Precipitation 6month MA -0.00500 0.00244
(0.00474) (0.00297)
Temperature 6month MA -0.00230 0.000486
(0.00381) (0.00245)
Lean Season 0.00873* 0.00284
(0.00475) (0.00304)
WFP procurements current -2.96e-05** -1.87e-07
(1.45e-05) (9.17e-06)
WFP (neighbors) current 5.22e-06 2.18e-06
(4.28e-06) (2.71e-06)
Surplus Season -0.00357 0.00460*
(0.00430) (0.00275)
National CPI 0.00418*** 0.00171***
(0.000748) (0.000461)
Transportation CPI 0.00131*** -0.000115
(0.000217) (0.000127)
Residual lag 1 0.136***
(0.0311)
Residual lag 2 0.00583
(0.0312)
Constant 0.378*** 0.0449
(0.0593) (0.0274)
Observations 952 936
R-squared 0.961 0.110
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-2: Non-procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: Beans (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.965***
(0.0350)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0817**
(0.0342)
Procurement current 0.000424 -7.86e-05
(0.000589) (0.000370)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000182 -0.000137
(0.000648) (0.000408)
Procurement lag 2 0.000443 -0.000148
(0.000628) (0.000396)
Log world prices current 0.0357 0.0292
(0.0294) (0.0192)
Log world prices lag 1 0.0343 -0.0643**
(0.0474) (0.0306)
Log world prices lag 2 -0.0410 0.0344*
(0.0291) (0.0185)
Precipitation 6month MA -0.00295 0.00114
(0.00486) (0.00303)
Temperature 6month MA -0.00278 0.000389
(0.00391) (0.00251)
Lean Season 0.00505 0.00360
(0.00486) (0.00310)
WFP procurements current -1.94e-05 -8.82e-07
(1.49e-05) (9.38e-06)
WFP (neighbors) current 6.24e-06 2.10e-06
(4.40e-06) (2.77e-06)
Surplus Season -0.00400 0.00396
(0.00441) (0.00281)
National CPI 0.00393*** 0.00174***
(0.000771) (0.000472)
Transportation CPI 0.00121*** -0.000121
(0.000224) (0.000130)
Residual lag 1 0.147***
(0.0334)
Residual lag 2 0.0162
(0.0333)
Constant 0.360*** 0.0299
(0.0613) (0.0280)
Observations 833 819
R-squared 0.964 0.121
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-3: Procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: Beans (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.903***
(0.0926)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0168
(0.0935)
Procurement current 0.00320 -0.000264
(0.00200) (0.00121)
Procurement lag 1 -0.00446** -0.000459
(0.00220) (0.00133)
Procurement lag 2 0.00411* -0.000967
(0.00215) (0.00130)
Log world prices current 0.196* -0.0129
(0.101) (0.0653)
Log world prices lag 1 -0.311* 0.0560
(0.160) (0.101)
Log world prices lag 2 0.0996 -0.0594
(0.0974) (0.0607)
Precipitation 6month MA -0.0219 0.00886
(0.0169) (0.0101)
Temperature 6month MA 0.00201 -0.00205
(0.0133) (0.00818)
Lean Season 0.0414** 0.000787
(0.0176) (0.0110)
WFP procurements current -0.000101** 1.26e-05
(5.09e-05) (3.20e-05)
WFP (neighbors) current -2.93e-06 7.88e-06
(1.50e-05) (9.05e-06)
Surplus Season -0.00538 0.00365
(0.0155) (0.00959)
National CPI 0.00614** 0.00138
(0.00259) (0.00155)
Transportation CPI 0.00201*** -0.000133
(0.000736) (0.000431)
Residual lag 1 0.153
(0.0948)
Residual lag 2 -0.00563
(0.0941)
Constant 0.461** 0.116
(0.195) (0.0912)
Observations 119 117
R-squared 0.943 0.128
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-4: All Market E↵ects: Incaparina (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 1.005***
(0.0333)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0844***
(0.0321)
Procurement current -0.000224 -0.000258**
(0.000167) (0.000112)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000134 -3.34e-05
(0.000176) (0.000118)
Procurement lag 2 -0.000169 -0.000210*
(0.000175) (0.000117)
Log world prices current -0.00412 0.0138**
(0.00870) (0.00586)
Log world prices lag 1 0.0608*** -0.00892
(0.0134) (0.00913)
Log world prices lag 2 -0.0366*** 0.00352
(0.00930) (0.00624)
Precipitation 6month MA -0.00273** -1.21e-05
(0.00130) (0.000876)
Temperature 6month MA 7.74e-05 0.000431
(0.00116) (0.000782)
Lean Season -0.00477*** 0.000583
(0.00154) (0.00104)
WFP procurements current -1.37e-06 -1.02e-06
(1.32e-06) (8.84e-07)
WFP (neighbors) current -2.40e-06* -1.52e-06*
(1.27e-06) (8.48e-07)
Surplus Season -0.00252* 0.00202**
(0.00141) (0.000949)
National CPI 0.000804*** 0.000275*
(0.000225) (0.000150)
Transportation CPI 0.000702*** -7.24e-05
(0.000127) (4.57e-05)
Residual lag 1 0.0183
(0.0334)
Residual lag 2 0.00439
(0.0338)
Constant 0.301*** -0.0268***
(0.0502) (0.00953)
Observations 952 936
R-squared 0.995 0.080
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-5: Non-procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: Incaparina (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES lprice e a
Log prices lag 1 1.012***
(0.0354)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0899***
(0.0342)
Procurement current -0.000185 -0.000371***
(0.000176) (0.000118)
Procurement lag 1 -8.29e-05 1.12e-05
(0.000186) (0.000125)
Procurement lag 2 -0.000261 -0.000337***
(0.000185) (0.000124)
Log world prices current -0.000508 0.0146**
(0.00918) (0.00620)
Log world prices lag 1 0.0546*** -0.00746
(0.0142) (0.00967)
Log world prices lag 2 -0.0350*** 0.000985
(0.00981) (0.00662)
Precipitation 6month MA -0.00281** 0.000483
(0.00137) (0.000928)
Temperature 6month MA 0.000146 0.000126
(0.00123) (0.000827)
Lean Season -0.00457*** 0.000656
(0.00159) (0.00108)
WFP procurements current -1.98e-06 -9.52e-07
(1.40e-06) (9.36e-07)
WFP (neighbors) current -2.22e-06* -1.92e-06**
(1.35e-06) (8.98e-07)
Surplus Season -0.00283* 0.00191*
(0.00145) (0.000975)
National CPI 0.000826*** 0.000278*
(0.000238) (0.000159)
Transportation CPI 0.000698*** -6.32e-05
(0.000133) (4.83e-05)
Residual lag 1 -0.00252
(0.0354)
Residual lag 2 -0.0131
(0.0355)
Constant 0.298*** -0.0258**
(0.0524) (0.0101)
Observations 833 819
R-squared 0.995 0.090
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-6: Procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: Incaparina (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.994***
(0.106)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0816
(0.102)
Procurement current -0.000501 0.000439
(0.000534) (0.000315)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000459 -6.21e-05
(0.000560) (0.000336)
Procurement lag 2 0.000526 -0.000116
(0.000562) (0.000332)
Log world prices current -0.0306 0.00169
(0.0280) (0.0171)
Log world prices lag 1 0.104** -0.00478
(0.0429) (0.0263)
Log world prices lag 2 -0.0473 0.0151
(0.0302) (0.0176)
Precipitation 6month MA -0.00219 -0.00277
(0.00415) (0.00248)
Temperature 6month MA -0.000462 0.00279
(0.00365) (0.00224)
Lean Season -0.00533 0.00186
(0.00692) (0.00417)
WFP procurements current 2.97e-06 -4.25e-06*
(4.25e-06) (2.49e-06)
WFP (neighbors) current -3.79e-06 1.80e-07
(4.04e-06) (2.38e-06)
Surplus Season 9.77e-05 0.00419
(0.00665) (0.00395)
National CPI 0.000577 0.000442
(0.000726) (0.000425)
Transportation CPI 0.000710 -0.000131
(0.000453) (0.000129)
Residual lag 1 0.133
(0.102)
Residual lag 2 0.00120
(0.111)
Constant 0.321* -0.0421
(0.185) (0.0267)
Observations 119 117
R-squared 0.994 0.165
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-7: All Market E↵ects: White Maize (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.915***
(0.0327)
Log prices lag 2 -0.106***
(0.0327)
Procurement current -0.000299 0.000187
(0.000304) (0.000278)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000217 -9.22e-05
(0.000327) (0.000299)
Procurement lag 2 -1.89e-06 2.38e-05
(0.000325) (0.000298)
Log world prices current 0.0449 0.0313
(0.123) (0.114)
Log world prices lag 1 0.00586 -0.137
(0.188) (0.174)
Log world prices lag 2 0.0940 0.165
(0.130) (0.119)
Precipitation 6month MA 0.0301* -0.00454
(0.0182) (0.0167)
Temperature 6month MA -0.0188 0.00404
(0.0161) (0.0150)
Lean Season -0.0171 0.0110
(0.0220) (0.0203)
WFP procurements current -9.88e-07 -2.05e-06
(1.02e-05) (9.43e-06)
WFP (neighbors) current -2.80e-06 1.52e-06
(8.83e-06) (8.15e-06)
Surplus Season -0.0216 -0.00779
(0.0201) (0.0184)
National CPI -0.00483 -0.000446
(0.00311) (0.00286)
Transportation CPI -0.000377 -0.00151
(0.00103) (0.000929)
Residual lag 1 0.149***
(0.0327)
Residual lag 2 0.153***
(0.0327)
Constant 0.153 -0.111
(0.216) (0.190)
Observations 952 936
R-squared 0.759 0.097
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
8
! 63!
 
  
Table A-8: Non-procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: White Maize (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.914***
(0.0350)
Log prices lag 2 -0.105***
(0.0350)
Procurement current -0.000314 0.000193
(0.000347) (0.000317)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000239 -9.50e-05
(0.000372) (0.000341)
Procurement lag 2 4.35e-06 2.55e-05
(0.000371) (0.000340)
Log world prices current 0.0534 0.0349
(0.141) (0.130)
Log world prices lag 1 0.00718 -0.157
(0.214) (0.198)
Log world prices lag 2 0.0966 0.183
(0.148) (0.136)
Precipitation 6month MA 0.0335 -0.00449
(0.0207) (0.0191)
Temperature 6month MA -0.0207 0.00427
(0.0184) (0.0171)
Lean Season -0.0193 0.0110
(0.0245) (0.0227)
WFP procurements current -5.73e-07 -1.58e-06
(1.16e-05) (1.08e-05)
WFP (neighbors) current -3.26e-06 1.74e-06
(1.01e-05) (9.30e-06)
Surplus Season -0.0252 -0.00916
(0.0222) (0.0204)
National CPI -0.00545 -0.000607
(0.00355) (0.00327)
Transportation CPI -0.000637 -0.00165
(0.00117) (0.00106)
Residual lag 1 0.149***
(0.0350)
Residual lag 2 0.153***
(0.0350)
Constant 0.121 -0.109
(0.245) (0.216)
Observations 833 819
R-squared 0.753 0.096
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-9: Procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: White Maize (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.929***
(0.0984)
Log prices lag 2 -0.146
(0.102)
Procurement current -0.000180 0.000154
(0.000200) (0.000122)
Procurement lag 1 -4.89e-05 -7.18e-05
(0.000215) (0.000131)
Procurement lag 2 -4.77e-05 -8.68e-05
(0.000212) (0.000130)
Log world prices current 0.00741 0.0462
(0.0802) (0.0525)
Log world prices lag 1 -0.0457 -0.0416
(0.123) (0.0771)
Log world prices lag 2 0.0892 0.0532
(0.0842) (0.0518)
Precipitation 6month MA 0.00379 -0.00796
(0.0120) (0.00741)
Temperature 6month MA -0.00827 0.00922
(0.0118) (0.00673)
Lean Season 0.0383* 0.0180
(0.0208) (0.0125)
WFP procurements current -5.55e-06 -4.71e-06
(6.61e-06) (4.17e-06)
WFP (neighbors) current 2.28e-06 -3.47e-06
(5.73e-06) (3.57e-06)
Surplus Season 0.0413** 0.00469
(0.0196) (0.0118)
National CPI -0.000335 0.00178
(0.00200) (0.00134)
Transportation CPI 0.00176* -0.000509
(0.000975) (0.000405)
Residual lag 1 0.0257
(0.0969)
Residual lag 2 -0.0835
(0.101)
Constant 0.457* -0.224***
(0.260) (0.0852)
Observations 119 117
R-squared 0.951 0.187
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-10: All Market E↵ects: Yellow Maize (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.910***
(0.0362)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0817**
(0.0362)
Procurement current -0.000374 0.000199
(0.000366) (0.000338)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000135 -8.84e-05
(0.000391) (0.000361)
Procurement lag 2 1.99e-05 -7.87e-05
(0.000391) (0.000361)
Log world prices current 0.0265 0.0160
(0.150) (0.139)
Log world prices lag 1 0.117 -0.132
(0.229) (0.213)
Log world prices lag 2 -0.0128 0.178
(0.158) (0.147)
Precipitation 6month MA 0.0325 0.00109
(0.0222) (0.0207)
Temperature 6month MA -0.0155 0.000937
(0.0197) (0.0184)
Lean Season -0.0493* 0.00508
(0.0275) (0.0258)
WFP procurements current 4.99e-06 -5.59e-07
(1.25e-05) (1.17e-05)
WFP (neighbors) current -5.23e-06 -2.26e-06
(1.06e-05) (9.88e-06)
Surplus Season -0.0290 -0.0267
(0.0249) (0.0232)
National CPI -0.00444 -0.00186
(0.00379) (0.00353)
Transportation CPI -0.000609 -0.00178
(0.00127) (0.00117)
Residual lag 1 0.127***
(0.0363)
Residual lag 2 0.135***
(0.0364)
Constant 0.191 -0.0701
(0.261) (0.234)
Observations 780 762
R-squared 0.760 0.083
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-11: Non-procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: Yellow Maize (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.903***
(0.0384)
Log prices lag 2 -0.0857**
(0.0384)
Procurement current -0.000342 0.000174
(0.000410) (0.000378)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000124 -3.74e-05
(0.000440) (0.000405)
Procurement lag 2 -1.26e-05 -7.87e-05
(0.000439) (0.000405)
Log world prices current 0.0759 -0.00581
(0.168) (0.156)
Log world prices lag 1 0.0266 -0.108
(0.255) (0.238)
Log world prices lag 2 0.0721 0.181
(0.176) (0.163)
Precipitation 6month MA 0.0296 -0.00276
(0.0246) (0.0229)
Temperature 6month MA -0.0211 0.000561
(0.0219) (0.0205)
Lean Season -0.0535* 0.0128
(0.0297) (0.0278)
WFP procurements current 5.93e-06 2.23e-07
(1.38e-05) (1.30e-05)
WFP (neighbors) current -7.35e-06 1.20e-06
(1.19e-05) (1.11e-05)
Surplus Season -0.0399 -0.0270
(0.0268) (0.0248)
National CPI -0.00581 -0.00160
(0.00422) (0.00392)
Transportation CPI -0.000943 -0.00186
(0.00140) (0.00128)
Residual lag 1 0.142***
(0.0385)
Residual lag 2 0.148***
(0.0385)
Constant 0.0631 -0.0942
(0.288) (0.259)
Observations 695 679
R-squared 0.748 0.093
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-12: Procurement/distribution Market E↵ects: Yellow Maize (Regression Output)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log Price Price Volatility
Log prices lag 1 0.865***
(0.115)
Log prices lag 2 0.0317
(0.112)
Procurement current -0.000330 9.25e-05
(0.000481) (0.000303)
Procurement lag 1 -0.000173 -0.000202
(0.000505) (0.000321)
Procurement lag 2 0.000517 -4.75e-05
(0.000515) (0.000325)
Log world prices current -0.302 -0.109
(0.202) (0.129)
Log world prices lag 1 0.606* 0.113
(0.310) (0.198)
Log world prices lag 2 -0.429* 0.0796
(0.219) (0.138)
Precipitation 6month MA 0.0188 0.0114
(0.0333) (0.0201)
Temperature 6month MA 0.0244 0.0165
(0.0287) (0.0181)
Lean Season 0.101* -0.145***
(0.0558) (0.0375)
WFP procurements current -8.27e-06 -5.28e-06
(1.82e-05) (1.13e-05)
WFP (neighbors) current 8.38e-06 -1.26e-05
(1.40e-05) (9.31e-06)
Surplus Season 0.169*** -0.130***
(0.0521) (0.0361)
National CPI 0.00626 -0.000688
(0.00541) (0.00342)
Transportation CPI 0.00117 -0.00140
(0.00212) (0.00143)
Residual lag 1 -0.0951
(0.114)
Residual lag 2 -0.219*
(0.112)
Constant 0.815* -0.0462
(0.434) (0.224)
Observations 85 83
R-squared 0.890 0.269
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-19: Preparation, Maize and Rice (ordered logit random e↵ects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fuel Use Time Water Use Costs E↵ort
LRP (D) 1.09* .482 -1.15 -1.22 .402
(.636) (.651) (.704) (1.01) (.826)
Age -.015 -.014 -.016 4.0e-03 -.027*
(.011) (.011) (.017) (.021) (.016)
Education .036 .027 .109 .283*** .062
(.049) (.042) (.095) (.106) (.063)
Language (D) -.918 -1.08** -.546 -3.06*** -1.67*
(.861) (.506) (.606) (.792) (.927)
HH Members b/w 19-60 -.063 -.109 -.049 -.011 -.065
(.187) (.203) (.221) (.227) (.171)
Total HH Members -.067 .012 -.034 -.152 .058
(.099) (.076) (.136) (.109) (.07)
Female head of HH (D) .706 -.206 .81 -.952 .336
(.482) (.512) (.549) (.714) (.5)
Mkt frequency 2/week (D) .311 .556*** 2.55*** 1.17*** .699**
(.322) (.137) (.306) (.287) (.273)
Mkt frequency 3/week (D) .728* .625*** 4.89*** .497 1.54***
(.388) (.171) (.51) (1.08) (.37)
Mkt access by foot (D) -.716*** -.601*** -1.98*** -3.39*** -.465
(.221) (.111) (.304) (.853) (.469)
Mkt access by dirt road (D) -.808 .261* -.922*** .26 -.52
(.563) (.15) (.334) (.22) (.333)
Distance to mkt (km) -.012 .025*** .041*** .089*** .03***
(.016) (4.7e-03) (7.2e-03) (.014) (.011)
Distance to mkt (minutes) -7.6e-03*** -6.3e-03*** -.015*** -.016*** 4.9e-03**
(2.2e-03) (8.6e-04) (2.2e-03) (3.1e-03) (2.2e-03)
Mkt accessibility (D) 1.2*** .928*** 2.63*** 3.72*** -.027
(.244) (.142) (.387) (.705) (.355)
Monthly rations received 3.4e-03 -4.8e-03 -.024 -.015 -.034
(.022) (.016) (.02) (.03) (.028)
Observations 236 237 238 227 238
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
D denotes dummy variable
20
! 75!
 
  
Table A-20: Preparation, Beans (ordered logit random e↵ects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fuel Use Time Water Use E↵ort
LRP (D) 3.61*** 2.12*** .615 -.019
(1.25) (.818) (1.13) (1.27)
Age -.015 .013 .011 .016
(.02) (.02) (.025) (.032)
Education .027 .32* .207 .448*
(.078) (.167) (.151) (.243)
Language (D) -1.18 -1.41 -1.93 -3.28**
(1.44) (1.21) (1.41) (1.66)
HH Members b/w 19-60 -.069 .314* .025 .076
(.284) (.185) (.166) (.244)
Total HH Members -8.5e-03 -.114 -6.5e-04 -.011
(.094) (.182) (.119) (.113)
Female head of HH (D) -.397 -.273 .352 -.285
(.745) (.537) (.63) (.364)
Mkt frequency 2/week (D) -.176 .293 -.664* .037
(.301) (.332) (.37) (.492)
Mkt frequency 3/week (D) .7* 2.54*** .065 -.947
(.409) (.416) (.483) (1.45)
Mkt access by foot (D) -1.1*** -2.21*** -.827*** -2.1**
(.26) (.571) (.317) (.938)
Mkt access by dirt road (D) -.29 .277 .462 -.731
(.354) (.336) (.405) (.612)
Distance to mkt (km) .01 .071*** .04** .037
(.011) (.022) (.018) (.024)
Distance to mkt (minutes) -.027*** -.033*** -.031*** -.02***
(4.1e-03) (7.1e-03) (6.1e-03) (3.6e-03)
Mkt accessibility (D) .73** 1.32* 2.53*** 1.71**
(.31) (.736) (.72) (.69)
Monthly rations received -.03 -.02 -.059** -.12**
(.019) (.022) (.028) (.053)
Observations 238 237 238 237
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
D denotes dummy variable
21
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Table A-21: Preparation, CSB (ordered logit random e↵ects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fuel Use Time Water Use Costs E↵ort
LRP (D) -.092 -1.11 .595 -1.28 -1.44*
(.854) (.814) (1.64) (1.11) (.745)
Age -.02 .01 -.017 -.029 .012
(.012) (.016) (.027) (.03) (.025)
Education -.037 .099 -.036 .147 .17
(.066) (.092) (.216) (.128) (.16)
Language (D) -2.94* -2.61*** -2.1 -2.21*** -.881***
(1.54) (.912) (1.6) (.777) (.216)
HH Members b/w 19-60 .12 .032 .261 .063 -.097
(.135) (.09) (.22) (.215) (.157)
Total HH Members .033 .061 -2.9e-03 -.277** .155
(.122) (.052) (.131) (.124) (.138)
Female head of HH (D) -.281 -.433 -.389 -.453 -.208
(.385) (.44) (.641) (.813) (.555)
Mkt frequency 2/week (D) .134 .364 1.53*** 1.01* .972
(.27) (.23) (.39) (.568) (.65)
Mkt frequency 3/week (D) -.662 -.267 1.74*** -1.73 -1.51***
(.602) (.193) (.637) (1.09) (.373)
Mkt access by foot (D) 1.52** 1.04*** 1.32** -1.67*** -.221
(.676) (.392) (.53) (.475) (.211)
Mkt access by dirt road (D) -1.6** -1.68*** 1.05 -.541 -.924***
(.673) (.414) (.753) (.519) (.333)
Distance to mkt (km) -.033 -.032** .052*** .036*** -6.3e-03
(.022) (.013) (.016) (.011) (.01)
Distance to mkt (minutes) -3.5e-04 -2.3e-03 -7.8e-03 -.018*** -4.6e-03
(3.8e-03) (2.8e-03) (5.0e-03) (2.7e-03) (2.8e-03)
Mkt accessibility (D) .092 .413* .114 3.21*** .97***
(.383) (.228) (.524) (.649) (.356)
Monthly rations received .015 -9.3e-03 -.019 7.4e-03 -.039
(.015) (.021) (.058) (.027) (.029)
Observations 237 237 237 227 237
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
D denotes dummy variable
22
! 77!
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-22: Maize and Bean Quality Requirements
Characteristic Max % (per 5 lb sample)
Humidity 14 %
Burnt grains 3 %
Impurities 3 %
Stained 2 %
Descalentado ??? 2 %
Grains with fungi growth 2 %
Broken grains 1 %
Plagued grains 0 %
Residual or trash 1 %
Aflatoxins 20g/Kg
Free of insects Recommended use of aluminum phosphide (not to exceed 0.01 ppm)
Table A-23: CSB Quality Requirements
Characteristic Standard
Humidity Max 10%
Protein content Min 18 %
Color Beige/yellow
Microorganism content Max 100,000 UFC/g
Mold and yeast content 10,000 UFC/g
Fecal coliform bacteria Max 6 NMP/g
Salmonella Max 0/25gr
Aflatoxins Max 20 ppb
Energy 340 kcal/100 gr
Vit A 3000 UI/100 gr
Thiamine 2 mg/100 gr
Riboflavin 1.3 mg/100 gr
Folic Acid 357 mcg/100 gr
Vit B12 3.21 mcg/100 gr
Calcium 350 mg/100 gr
Niacine 20 mg/100 gr
Iron 25 mg/100 gr
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CHAPTER 3 
 
IS LATE REALLY BETTER THAN NEVER? THE FARMER 
WELFARE EFFECTS OF PINEAPPLE ADOPTION IN GHANA1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been much optimism about the prospects for development through 
agricultural exports in low-income countries (World Bank 2008). Since the majority of 
the poor in developing countries are farmers, sustained growth in agriculture has the 
potential to substantially reduce poverty. Several studies examine the increased 
opportunities of smallholders due to the proliferation of supermarkets in low- to middle-
income countries as well as the increase in exports due to liberalized rules of trade and 
foreign direct investment and improvements in logistics and infrastructure (Reardon et al. 
2009). Most careful evidence to date finds that, even controlling for the initial advantages 
often enjoyed by those who participate in modern agrifood value chains, smallholder 
suppliers tend to enjoy higher net earnings per hectare or per unit of output marketed, 
although this is by no means universal or uniform (Michelson 2013, Barrett et al. 2012). 
For example, Udry and Goldstein (1999) estimate that farmers in Ghana could achieve 
returns ten times higher for pineapple than for maize or cassava. 
In response to these generally positive effects for smallholders, aid agencies have 
invested heavily in efforts to train and equip farmers in developing countries to grow cash 
crops such as pineapple for export. They have recognized and attempted to alleviate some 
of the various constraints on farmers entering these markets by providing access to credit, 
technical and institutional training, and appropriate certification.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Written by Aurélie P. Harou, Thomas Walker and Christopher B. Barrett. !
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Crucial questions remain, however, about the ability of smallholders to succeed or 
even survive in export agricultural markets. Indeed, supplying modern value chains 
exposes producers to significant risks, especially if farmers reallocate land and other 
scarce inputs to the export crop, becoming vulnerable to disruptions outside local market 
control, such as changing foreign consumer preferences, exchange rates, or trade barriers 
(Maertens and Swinnen 2009). For example, the epilogue in Ashraf et al. (2009) studying 
the effects of Kenyan smallholders growing baby corn and French beans describes the 
catastrophic effect that farmers faced when their crop no longer met the revised Euro-
Retailer Produce Working Group Good Agricultural Practices (EurepGAP) 2005 
requirements. 
The case we study is similarly cautionary. European demand for fresh pineapple 
grew rapidly over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of expanded sea 
freight capacity from Ghana to Europe and increased demand for pineapple in Europe 
(FAOStat 2013, Fold and Gough 2008). From 2005, after almost a decade of rapid 
growth in pineapple production and exports, demand for Ghana’s pineapples suddenly 
fell sharply (Figure 1). The main explanation for the drop in demand was a sudden taste 
shift among European consumers from the variety of pineapple most commonly grown in 
Ghana, Smooth Cayenne, to a new variety called MD2 (Fold and Gough 2008). This 
paper studies the resulting welfare consequences of this exogenous market shock for 
farmers growing pineapple in four communities in the Akwapim South district of 
Southern Ghana, where the returns to pineapple adoption initially appeared extremely 
high (Conley and Udry 2010, Udry and Goldstein 1999). Because the onset and effects of 
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the shock were truly exogenous to the farmers in this study, we can treat the demand 
shock as a natural experiment.  
More specifically, this study compares the implications for smallholder farm 
household welfare of the timing of a farmer’s decisions to grow pineapple – early vs. late 
vs. non-adopters – and to discontinue pineapple cultivation following an adverse market 
shock. In the canonical model of the farmer welfare effects of technology adoption 
(Cochrane 1958), early adopters systematically benefit most from the introduction of a 
new and lower-cost farm technology, non-adopters lose, and late adopters fall somewhere 
in between, perhaps benefitting, perhaps suffering some losses, but never as large as non-
adopters who face lower prices without enjoying lower costs. But that theory relies on a 
strong assumption that the new technology is unambiguously and permanently superior 
for the farmer. Although analysts commonly use technology adoption models to explain 
patterns of uptake of new products – such as pineapple in Ghana (Conley and Udry 2010, 
Udry and Goldstein 1999), sunflower in Mozambique (Bandiera and Rasul 2006), or 
horticultural crops in Kenya (Ashraf et al. 2009) – a new crop is more profitable only 
conditional on consumer demand. If market demand for the new crop suddenly collapses, 
due to shifting standards (Ashraf et al. 2009), consumer tastes (Fold and Gough 2008), or 
if the market price collapses due to excessive aggregate supply expansion in the face of 
price inelastic demand (McKay et al. 1997), then adoption no longer unambiguously 
dominates non-adoption. In that case, timing of entry into and exit from the market 
matters. And in the case of perennial crops, like pineapple, non-trivial sunk costs to 
market entry or exit create frictions that can cause predictable delays in entry and/or exit 
that can then prove costly. This basic insight has been overlooked to date in the literature 
! 81!
on smallholder crop choice and technology adoption. In this paper, we explore whether 
those southern Ghanaian farmers who never cultivated pineapple are better or worse off 
than farmers who decided to adopt the technology earlier or later. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and section 3 provides some background on pineapple in Ghana. 
Section 4 then explains the data. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy and section 6 
discusses the results while section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Considerable research in agricultural and development economics has been 
dedicated to the issue of technology adoption in an attempt to help increase production 
and incomes, and to reduce consumer prices. Different strands of the technology adoption 
literature examine the drivers of adoption, including education, availability of the 
technology, labor and input use, costs, climatic conditions and access to credit (Feder et 
al. 1985). More recently, the literature has focused on the role of learning externalities 
and social learning from neighbors, agents and/or social networks (Bandiera and Rasul 
2006, Moser and Barrett 2006, Foster and Rosenzweig 1996). Using the early rounds of 
the data used in this study, Conley and Udry (2010) show how farmers in Akwapim 
South district learned from their friends and relatives how to cultivate pineapple and 
gained significant returns from doing so. A host of other studies examine and seek to 
explain the low observed adoption rates of certain technologies (Foltz et al. 2011). 
Far fewer studies examine the causes and/or effects of farmers who had adopted a 
technology but subsequently stop using, or “disadopt”, the technology. Suri (2011) 
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studies the dynamics of adoption of maize hybrid seeds by Kenyan farmers by 
categorizing three types of farmers. A small group of farmers have high expected returns 
to adopting the improved hybrid seed variety yet do not due to the higher costs of supply 
and infrastructure constraints. A second group faces lower but still high returns and do 
adopt hybrid seeds in every period. Finally, a third group of farmers who have essentially 
zero net returns switch in and out of using hybrid seeds from period to period. This last 
group of marginal farmers switch into and out of adoption in response to exogenous 
changes in costs of and access to inputs and seeds they face in a season. Farmers with 
high net returns typically adopt a technology while those with low returns do not, but 
because expected net returns can vary seasonally, the same farmer may fall in either 
group at different times.  
Moser and Barrett (2006) study the dynamics of technology adoption – adoption, 
expansion and disadoption -- of a low input rice production method, the system of rice 
intensification (SRI), in Madagascar.  They seek to understand the low adoption rates and 
high disadoption rates of SRI despite the considerable crop yield increases the method 
allows without any new purchased inputs. They find that farmer education and liquidity 
and labor availability affect the farmers’ likelihood of trying the new technology. They 
also find that learning effects and unobserved farmer fixed effects such as skill and 
motivation play a major role in the farmers’ decisions to try and to continue with the new 
technology. Labor requirements, in particular, are a large obstacle to SRI adoption as 
many of the poorer households have highly seasonal labor and income patterns.  
Neill and Lee (2001) study the adoption and subsequent disadoption of the 
sustainable agricultural practice, ‘slash and mulch’, which allows Honduran farmers to 
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produce more maize on less land. After the spontaneous diffusion of the practice, a 
widespread decline was observed roughly five years later. Cameron (1999) examines the 
dynamics of seed adoption in Maharashtra, India, also highlighting the importance of 
learning and unobserved household heterogeneity on the adoption decision. Despite the 
findings of these studies reviewed here, there remain many questions about the dynamics 
of adoption. In this paper, we examine the long-term welfare effects of adoption of a cash 
crop and more specifically we examine the effects of timing on welfare.  
 
3. Pineapple in Ghana 
Pineapple (Ananas comosus) is a unique crop for multiple reasons. Pineapple is a 
perennial not grown from seed, but rather from vegetative propagation called ‘suckers’, 
produced as side shoots from the plant’s main stem. Each plant bears a single fruit and 
multiple suckers, which then subsequently generate fruit themselves. It takes some time 
before a farmer can harvest, typically 10-20 months after suckers are planted. And if a 
farmer decides to discontinue pineapple, s/he must dig up and remove the plants. 
Pineapple cultivation also does not follow a seasonal calendar. In Akwapim South, 
pineapples can be grown at any time of the year. Entry into the pineapple market thus 
involves a longer-term investment and greater sunk entry and exist costs than does the 
seasonal cultivation of grains, roots and tubers that has been customary in Akwapim 
South. These characteristics create frictions that impede both entry and exit (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994, Chavas 1994), impeding the sort of easy and regular transition between 
adoption and disadoption that is feasible with respect to farmers’ seed and fertilizer 
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choices, for example (Suri 2011). The timing of entry and exit into an industry like 
pineapple can therefore matter a great deal in the face of stochastic market conditions. 
Pineapples grow best in slightly more acidic soils, with an optimum pH ranging 
between 4.5 and 6.5, which is lower than most other crops. Maize, for example, grows 
best in soils with a pH of 6.0-7.0. Furthermore, pineapples can survive long dry periods, 
although sufficient water is important during flowering and fruiting (FAO, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/cropinfo_pineapple.html). 
Smooth Cayenne, a variety that originated in Hawaii, is among one of the most 
common pineapple varieties. It is sweet, juicy and especially well suited to canning and 
processing. Coastal West Africa’s climate and relative proximity to ports and to Europe 
gave it both cost and quality advantages in the export market for fresh Smooth Cayenne 
pineapple. In the 1990s, as transport bottlenecks that had limited fresh fruit export 
volumes relaxed, Ghana’s pineapple production increased significantly. Farmers who 
entered the pineapple market in the 1990s enjoyed significant increases in farm profits 
relative to the maize-cassava intercropping that had prevailed for many years (Conley and 
Udry 2010, 2001). The strong reported profits and abundant technical assistance available 
to southern Ghanaian smallholders from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s attracted 
many new entrants into pineapple production. 
A competing variety, MD2, was aggressively propagated by Del Monte in Costa 
Rica and marketed in Europe in the early 2000s to meet consumer demand for sweet, 
juicy and yellow pineapples (Fold and Gough 2008). MD2 are slightly smaller and have a 
more square shape than Smooth Cayenne, thereby lending themselves better to packing 
and stacking on supermarket and refrigerator shelves. Enjoying ideal growing conditions 
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and significant economies of scale, from the early 2000s Costa Rica’s lower cost of MD2 
production began significantly undercutting Smooth Cayenne in the competition for 
European retail markets, gutting Côte d’Ivoire’s once-dominant market share and 
significantly diverting demand from Ghana too (Fold and Gough 2008, http://developeconomies.com/development;economics/a;brief;history;of;fresh;pineapple;exports;in;ghana/).2  
The demand for the primary pineapple variety grown in Ghana decreased as early 
as the end of 2003, and was noticed by major players in the industry in Ghana at that time 
(Ghanaian Chronicle 2004). When describing the market shock to us, farmers recounted 
having to leave their entire crop to rot in the fields when the buyers stopped coming. 
Some reported losing thousands of dollars in revenue, more than the total assets of the 
median household in the survey communities. While farmers previously had informal 
agreements to sell to certain buyers, they quickly learned to demand written contracts 
from buyers and formed cooperatives to provide legal support in the event that the 
contracts were not honored. While there were initiatives to equip farmers to shift to the 
new variety, MD2, involving partnerships between government, aid donors and large 
pineapple processing companies (GNA 2004), many smallholder farmers left the 
pineapple industry in the wake of this market shock.   
The industry consolidated in the wake of the collapse of the European export 
market for Smooth Cayenne, with large firms supplying the bulk of Ghana's MD2 for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Ghanaian farmers might also have lost their ability to export to Europe because of the 
widespread adoption of a new and demanding certification standard, EurepGAP, in 
Europe around the same time. However, discussions with focus group participants 
suggest the new certification standards were of minor concern. Farmers reported being 
offered timely support from NGOs to adopt the standards and pass the audits.!
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export. Smallholder farmers who continued to farm as of 2009-10 concentrated mainly on 
supplying Smooth Cayenne to local factories for canning and juicing, with only a limited 
amount of Smooth Cayenne being exported from Ghana. The change of fortunes for 
southern Ghana’s pineapple producers over the course of a decade or less was striking. 
Ghana’s pineapple producers’ experience with the rise and fall of an export market offers 
uncommon insights into the welfare impacts of the timing of market entry and exit when 
producers face significant sunk costs that create frictions in these transitions. 
 
4. Data 
The data come from two surveys of four communities in the Akwapim South 
district in southern Ghana. The first survey, conducted in 1997 and 1998, interviewed 240 
individuals (spouses in 120 households), collecting extensive data on respondents’ 
farming practices, social networks and household characteristics, including a 15-month 
panel of data on household consumption and wealth3. Soil samples were also collected 
during the 1998 survey from each plot owned by a respondent. In 2009, 70 households in 
each of those same four villages were resurveyed using a nearly identical questionnaire to 
the 1997-98 survey instrument. Approximately half of the households surveyed in 2009 
were part of the initial 1997-98 sample.4 Five survey rounds were conducted (i.e., a round 
every two months), covering a wide range of subjects, including personal income, 
farming and non-farm business activities, gifts, transfers and loans, and household 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!Further details can be found in Udry and Goldstein (1999).!4!In the original sample, and in the 2009 re-sampling, we selected only from the pool of 
households headed by a resident married couple.  However, we retained households from 
the 1997-98 sample even if only one of the spouses remained. These ‘single-headed 
households’ account for between 7 and 15 of the sample households in each community.!
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consumption expenditures and respondents’ in-sample social networks. These data were 
supplemented with focus group discussions conducted in September 2009 and July 2010 
in the two main pineapple farming villages, Pokrom and Oboadaka. 
 
5. Econometric strategy 
We are interested in measuring and comparing the change in welfare experienced 
by different categories of farmers: those who never take up pineapple (‘nonadopters’) and 
those who enter (‘adopt’) the market early or late, as well as those entrants who exit the 
market (‘disadopt’) early or late.  The central prediction of the canonical farm technology 
adoption model (Cochrane 1958) is that early adopters gain relative to late adopters, who 
in turn fare better than nonadopters. The adage ‘better late than never’ follows directly. 
Allowing for the possibility that the new ‘technology’ subsequently becomes relatively 
unprofitable, the same logic holds that early disadopters would fare better than late 
disadopters. This logic yields a clear prediction of the ordering of the welfare effects 
between early adopters/early disadopters and late adopters/late disadopters. But for new 
crop adoption – as distinct from the adoption of a new production technology that is 
unambiguously and permanently superior if replaced (Foster and Rosenzweig 1996, 
Cochrane 1958) – it becomes ambiguous whether the ‘better late than never’ prediction 
holds. This requires empirical exploration that, to the best of our knowledge, has not 
previously been undertaken. 
Our key explanatory variable of interest is therefore the length of time (months) a 
farmer cultivated pineapple before and after the exogenous demand shock. Because the 
decision and timing of adoption is a choice variable that cannot be randomly assigned, 
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observed outcomes are likely correlated with both time-invariant and time-varying 
unobserved variables causing the point estimates of duration to be biased in a standard 
ordinary least squares framework. We therefore employ an instrumental variables 
strategy to account for the prospective selection bias in the timing of pineapple 
cultivation. In the first stage, we estimate a bivariate tobit model to predict how many 
months a household cultivates pineapple relative to the shock, using exogenous soil 
conditions as instruments. Using the household panel data, we then use a fixed effects 
framework in the second stage to eliminate time-invariant unobservables and estimate the 
effect of instrumented pineapple cultivation duration, pre- and post-shock, on household 
welfare, proxied by an asset index. Finally, given mean pre- and post-duration dates for 
different categories of farmers and the second stage estimation results, we estimate the 
mean welfare changes of distinct farmer groups: nonadopters, early adopters/early 
disadopters, early adopters/late disadopters, late adopters/early disadopters, and late 
adopters/late disadopters. The prospective differences among these distinct groups are the 
central topic of interest in this paper. 
More specifically, in the first stage, we estimate the duration (months) that a 
farmer cultivated pineapple before and after the export market shock. A bivariate tobit 
model accounts for the left censoring that occurs at zero for both pre- and post-duration 
variables for farmers who never farmed pineapple5. Therefore, we have, 
 !!"∗ = !!"! ! + !!!" 
    !!" = 0!!"!!!"∗ ≤ 0                 (1) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 55 percent of farmers never cultivated pineapple. 
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!!" = !!"∗ !!"!!!"∗ > 0 
 
where the variable y represents the observed duration measured in months and indexed 
by i for individuals and p = {pre, post} indicating whether duration is pre- or post-shock. 
The latent variable is !∗!~! (!,!!) and the Prob(!∗ ≤ 0) = Φ(−!/!) where Φ(. ) is the 
normal cumulative distribution function. The matrix !!  contains individual- and 
community-level explanatory variables. The bivariate model allows for correlation in the 
error terms for both duration variables, pre- and post-shock. Furthermore, we cluster 
errors to allow for correlation at the village level. 
As shown in Figure 1, the value and quantity of pineapples exported from Ghana 
decreased significantly from 2004 to 2005. We therefore use January 1, 2005 as the 
“shock date”, measuring the months before and after this date to determine the duration a 
farmer cultivated pineapple pre- and post-shock. The duration variables were constructed 
using data collected in the 2009 survey, asking farmers whether they farmed pineapple 
and the dates they started and ended farming it. The results described further below do 
not differ significantly when changing the shock date 6 months prior or 6 months post 
January 1, 2005. The median adoption date conditional on adoption pre-shock was 
January 1999 and the median disadoption date conditional on adoption post-shock date 
was March 2007.  
The first stage explanatory variables were taken from the 1998 surveys and 
include age and age squared to control for life cycle effects, gender, dummy variables for 
whether the respondent attended primary, secondary or high school, number of household 
members, number of household members likely to contribute household labor (ages 18-
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60), number of years having resided in the village, and a social network variable 
indicating the number of people a person knows6. Table 1 shows summary statistics for 
the variables used in the first stage estimation. Half of the sample is female with a mean 
age of 40, a mean household size of 8 of which on average 3.5 are of working age. Half 
of the respondents received schooling through middle school.  
Our ability to identify the welfare effects of the timing of pineapple adoption and 
disadoption rests on the challenging task of finding an instrument, z, that is correlated 
with the decision and duration of cultivating pineapple, but not with changes in farmers’ 
welfare status. We use two instruments, the lowest 1998 soil organic matter (SOM) and 
acidity (pH) levels observed among a farmer’s cultivated plots. Pineapple thrives in low 
pH and high SOM soils, so the likelihood that a farmer adopts and the duration s/he 
cultivates pineapple should be related to one or both of these variables. Meanwhile, high 
acidity (i.e., low pH) lowers the productivity of virtually all other crops grown in 
Akwapim South, while high SOM has the opposite effect. We would therefore not expect 
these variables to jointly affect change in farmer asset holdings independently of their 
effect on pineapple cultivation. But we also test the exclusionary restriction necessary for 
these to serve as suitable instruments for pineapple cultivation and confirm the statistical 
defensibility of this instrumental variables estimation strategy. The most acidic soil 
recorded had a pH of 4.3 with a mean pH of 6. The mean soil organic matter was 2.46 
percent. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Respondents were asked about their relationship with other villagers, including how 
well they knew the other villagers, how long they had known them and how often they 
had spoken to them. Here we simply control for the number of villagers a respondent 
knows. 
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Given the first stage bivariate tobit estimates, we predict the number of months 
that a household cultivated pineapple pre- and post-shock. For households from the 1997-
1998 survey the duration pre-shock is the number of months a farmer cultivated 
pineapple until 1998, the time of the survey. The post-shock duration for households 
surveyed in 1998 is always 0. We use these predicted values to estimate the effect of 
duration on welfare using a fixed effects model. Specifically, we estimate 
 
  !!" = ŷ!" + !!"! ! + !!! + !!"!   (2) 
  
where !!" is a measure of welfare for individual i at time t, ŷ!" is the predicted duration 
pre- and post-shock from the first stage, !! is a matrix of time-varying control variables, !! !is the individual-specific fixed effect and !!" is the error term, which captures any 
remaining individual- and time-specific unobservables that we assume to be i.i.d and 
mean zero. Table 2 includes summary statistics for the controls included in the second 
stage regression. 
We proxy welfare with an asset index. The use of assets and asset indices to 
measure household welfare has become more common over the last decade providing 
some advantages over other more common welfare measures, e.g., consumption, income 
and expenditures. Because assets are accumulated over time and last longer, they tend to 
better reflect a household’s permanent income or longer-term living standard than 
income, for example, which often suffers from seasonal variation and/or a large share of 
non-remunerated self-employment (Moser and Felton 2007, Sahn and Stifel 2000) or 
even expenditures, which are subject to liquidity constraints and greater measurement 
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error than easily-observed assets (Carter and Barrett 2006, Filmer and Pritchett 2001, 
Sahn and Stifel 2000). Several studies have indeed shown a strong link between 
household productive assets and subsequent poverty rates (Adato et al. 2006, Barrett et 
al. 2006).  
In constructing an asset index, one must choose a set of weights, w, to assign to 
each asset within an asset category. The weights are multiplied to the asset and summed 
over the different assets within a category to create the index. Commonly used weights 
include prices, unit values, principal components analysis, factor analysis, multiple 
correspondence analysis or polychoric principle components analysis (Moser and Felton 
2007). Obtaining asset prices can be difficult in the context of low-income rural 
communities where secondary markets for assets are thin and market prices may not 
accurately reflect the quality of an asset. Another method involves assigning each asset a 
binary value of 1 or 0 if it is owned or not and summing the number of assets within a 
category. While such a method is simple, it does not differentiate among assets with 
radically different values. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) recommend using principle 
components analysis (PCA) to aggregate several binary asset ownership variables into a 
single dimension. Sahn and Stifel (2000) use factor analysis (FA) instead of PCA to 
construct their asset index, arguing that FA offers more flexibility because it does not 
force all the components to explain the correlation structure between the assets. We 
follow the methodology of Sahn and Stifel (2000) and use factor analysis to create an 
asset index.  
We generate four asset indices, an asset index representing durable goods (e.g. 
bicycle, car, fan generator, radio, television, etc.), an asset representing livestock (e.g., 
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goats, lambs, sheep, ducks by gender, etc.), an index representing productive goods (e.g., 
barrel, chain saw, pick axe, pump, etc.) and finally an overall asset index encompassing 
all durable, livestock and productive goods. Summary statistics for each good owned by 
respondents comprising the asset indices are reported in Appendix A. Results of the 
factor analysis are reported in Appendix B.  
Summary statistics for the asset indices are reported in Table 3 by percentile and 
by year. Respondents were categorized into wealth percentiles. As expected, the mean 
value of the asset index increases by percentile group across all asset indices for both 
years.  
There are two additional sources of bias that may exist and that have not yet been 
addressed. The first source of potential bias is supplier-side bias whereby suppliers might 
select to purchase pineapples from farmers who have certain skills, access to resources or 
have plots closer to roads. In our discussions with pineapple grower groups, they 
explained that buyers would visit their village, often unannounced, and would purchase 
pineapples from any farmer whose pineapples were ready for harvest. We therefore 
assume no supplier-side selection effects exist in this particular setting. Finally, there is 
attrition from the 1998 to 2009 survey, which will also cause our estimates to be biased. 
We have not yet accounted for this bias but will do so in a future iteration of this paper. 
 
6. Results & Discussion 
Results from the first stage estimation of the bivariate tobit model are reported in 
Table 4. As expected, age has a positive effect on duration both pre- and post-shock with 
a decreasing marginal effect as age increases up to age 40-45 years, after which point 
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months of pineapple cultivation begins decreasing. Those with at least middle school 
level education are statistically significantly more likely to have adopted pineapple earlier 
(i.e., longer duration of pre-shock cultivation). Women are strongly and significantly less 
likely to have adopted pineapple, and much less early. Households with more working 
age members and those that have resided in the village longer exit pineapple cultivation 
statistically significantly sooner post-shock. This may reflect the limiting role of labor – 
from one’s own household or reciprocal work parties organized with neighbors – in 
disadopting pineapple by uprooting and removing the plants.  
Crucial to our identification strategy, an increase in soil pH level has a strong 
negative and statistically significant effect on the duration of pineapple cultivation pre- 
shock. This is exactly as expected given that pineapples grow better on more acidic soils 
and thus when they are profitable, those with suitable soils were more likely to enter the 
subsector. SOM does not have a statistically significant independent effect on pineapple 
cultivation duration, either pre- or post-shock. 
Given the estimated bivariate tobit model, we can predict the duration a 
household farmed pineapple before and after January 1, 2005. Figure 2 shows the 
observed and predicted latent durations pre- and post- shock. However, the predicted 
values must be censored at 0 such that no negative duration values exist. Post-censored 
mean values are shown in table 5. As can be seen in the bottom left of Figure 2, the post-
shock observations are right-censored at 56 months, the number of months between 
January 2005 and September 2009, the time of the last round of the 2009 survey, during 
which time some farmers were still farming pineapple. A future iteration of this paper 
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will try to also incorporate the right-censoring of the data in addition to the left-
censoring. 
We can use the predicted values to estimate the fixed effects model, equation (2) 
above. Results using the different asset indices as the left-hand side welfare measure are 
shown in Table 6. Duration before January 2005 has a low but positive effect on welfare, 
indicating that the earlier a farmer adopted pineapple during the period when it was 
profitable, the greater the household’s wealth. By contrast, duration of pineapple 
cultivation post-January 2005 has a slight negative effect on the asset index for most asset 
indices and importantly for the all-encompassing asset index. However, the effects are 
not statistically significant, but are robust when compared to a random effects model and 
a fixed effect model estimated on the subset of balanced data. 
Given the estimates reported in table 6, we can compare categories of farmers 
who farmed pineapple for different lengths of time, starting and ending at different times. 
We categorize four types of farmers -- early and late adopters who stop cultivating 
pineapple (“disadopt”) early or late relative to the January 2005 shock date. We define 
early adopters as those who began cultivating pineapple 120 months or 10 years before 
January 1, 2005 (January 1, 1995) and late adopters as those who began cultivating in 
January 2005, at the peak of Ghana’s pineapple exports and the threshold of the market 
collapse. We categorize early disadopters as those who stopped cultivating pineapple 10 
months after the shock and late disadopters as those who continued to cultivate pineapple 
for 40 months after the shock. Based on these categories, we estimate the mean asset 
indices per percentile of the population. 
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Mean asset indices for the different categories of farmers are tabulated and shown 
in Table 8. Absolutely consistent with the predictions of theory, early adopters who 
disadopt early are the best off, followed by early adopters who disadopt later. Similarly, 
late adopters who disadopt early are better off than late adopters who disadopt late. 
Interestingly, early adopters who disadopt late are worse off than late adopters who 
disadopt early.  
The most striking result, consistent across all indices, is that nonadopters are the 
best off. Nonadopters are only slightly better off than early adopters who disadopt early 
(their difference is statistically significant at the 1% level). The asset indices do not vary 
significantly across the initial wealth distribution within a given subgroup of farmers, 
indicating that these patterns are not especially sensitive to initial wealth conditions, 
although farmers who are initially better off do see slightly higher gains from early 
adoption and slightly smaller losses from late disadoption. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Our results show that there is a clear advantage for early adopters among farmers 
who cultivated pineapple. The magnitude of that advantage depends on the timing that 
growers stop cultivating if and when the new crop’s market price collapses, extinguishing 
the profits that exist initially. Timing market entry and exit optimally is notoriously 
difficult; but as our results show, it matters to the welfare effects of farmer uptake of a 
new, currently profitable crop. Even early adopters who disadopt long after a shock may 
see their initial gains evaporate if they remain in the market long after it collapses.  The 
early adopter advantage Cochrane (1958) emphasizes has an analog early disadopter 
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advantage in the case of adoption of crops whose prices subsequently collapse. As a 
result, the familiar adage ‘better late than never’ does not necessarily hold. As in the case 
of southern Ghanaian pineapple producers, those who never converted to the new crop 
were as well off as early adopters who disadopted early, missing potential gains from 
early adoption and missing the losses associated with continued pineapple cultivation. As 
a result, nonadopters proved significantly better off, several years after the market crash, 
than late adopters. 
There are important policy implications from these results. The introduction of 
new cash crops, especially those that may not have a domestic market and thus are 
subject to added market risk associated with exchange rates, foreign market access 
standards and consumer tastes, must be done so with caution. Under the best of 
circumstances, early adopters will benefit from increased profits associated with new 
products. However, the adoption of new technologies may expose smallholders to new 
and heightened market risks. Producers and those who promote new products must 
remain attuned to shifting market conditions and be prepared to facilitate orderly exit 
from the subsector if and when demand patterns shift adversely.   
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9. Figures 
 
 Figure 1. Pineapple quantity and value exported from Ghana (FAOSTAT, 2013) 
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Figure 2. Observed and predicted pre- and post-2005 duration variables (months) (left to 
right, top to bottom: duration pre-2005 duration (months); predicted duration pre-2005 
(months); duration post-2005 duration (months); predicted duration post-2005 (months)) 
 
Notes: Median start date is January 1999, median end date is March 2007, conditional on 
adoption.  
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10. Tables 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
dev. Min Max 
Duration (months) 280  47.10   73.11  0 327 
Duration pre-2005 (months) 282  44.11   76.34  0 428 
Duration post-2005 (months) 284  13.75   21.88  0 56 
Social network count 226  3.79   2.23  1 11 
Minimum pH 226  6.00   0.76  4.3 7.6 
Minimum Organic Matter 226  2.46   0.91  0.71 5.33 
Years of residence in village 242  66.96   64.69  1 400 
Age 238  40.42   13.17  18 89 
Female 247  0.50   0.50  0 1 
Household members 247  8.07   4.27  2 24 
Household Members of working age (18-50) 247  3.49   2.60  0 15 
Highest level of schooling: primary 247  0.17   0.37  0 1 
Highest level of schooling: middle school 247  0.52   0.50  0 1 
Highest level of schooling: high school 247  0.14   0.35  0 1 
Age, squared 238 1,806 1,274 324 7,921 
Table 1. Summary statistics for variables used in first stage variables 
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Darmang Konkonuru Oboadaka Pokrom 
  
1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 
Age (years) 
Mean 39.10 47.74 41.49 49.82 42.81 49.32 37.56 44.41 
Std. Dev. 12.36 10.29 12.37 13.33 12.70 13.83 11.81 14.06 
Min 21 27 23 25 18 21 19 19 
Max 87 74 70 90 75 78 80 79 
Age, squared Mean 1679 2384 1871 2657 1991 2622 1547 2167 
Std. Dev. 1216 1014 1148 1437 1180 1437 1093 1369 
School primary 
(=1 if yes) 
Mean 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.19 0.19 
Std. Dev. 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.40 
School middle 
(=1 if yes) 
Mean 0.57 0.69 0.65 0.61 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.53 
Std. Dev. 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.50 
School higher 
(=1 if yes) 
Mean 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.11 
Std. Dev. 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.27 0.38 0.29 0.37 0.31 
Household 
members 
Mean 7.93 7.19 8.29 6.36 10.28 8.42 6.19 6.49 
Std. Dev. 4.39 2.55 3.93 2.87 4.92 3.46 2.75 2.95 
Min 3 1 3 1 4 1 2 1 
Max 20 14 19 13 24 19 17 14 
Household 
members in 
work force 
Mean 3.29 4.52 3.70 3.98 4.61 4.99 2.51 3.48 
Std. Dev. 2.74 2.30 2.44 2.35 3.03 3.06 1.77 2.08 
Min 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 
Max 15 9 11 11 13 13 8 10 
Social network 
count 
Mean 3.88 103.16 3.15 115.66 4.48 109.00 3.76 89.34 
Std. Dev. 2.47 28.57 1.60 21.90 2.49 28.79 2.06 29.79 
Min 1 39 1 59 1 47 1 19 
Max 10 150 7 147 11 149 10 143 
Table 2. Summary statistics for controls used in the second stage (n = 529) 
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1998 2009 
  
mean std. dev. min max mean std. dev. min max 
Asset 
index 
0-25th -0.396 0.017 -0.481 -0.366 -0.381 0.009 -0.393 -0.366 
26-50th -0.307 0.047 -0.366 -0.201 -0.286 0.048 -0.366 -0.201 
51-75th -0.101 0.084 -0.201 0.121 -0.043 0.096 -0.200 0.127 
76-100th 0.294 0.145 0.206 0.588 0.756 1.808 0.129 27.886 
Durables 
asset index 
0-25th -0.499 0.021 -0.609 -0.492 -0.492 0.000 -0.492 -0.492 
26-50th -0.486 0.001 -0.486 -0.480 -0.466 0.008 -0.484 -0.455 
51-75th -0.220 0.099 -0.321 0.043 -0.227 0.165 -0.451 0.112 
76-100th 0.280 0.174 0.121 0.499 1.226 1.418 0.126 14.282 
Livestock 
asset index 
0-25th -0.474 0.018 -0.568 -0.455 -0.461 0.000 -0.461 -0.459 
26-50th -0.376 0.056 -0.454 -0.262 -0.341 0.053 -0.454 -0.258 
51-75th -0.099 0.100 -0.254 0.135 -0.070 0.118 -0.258 0.144 
76-100th 0.506 0.328 0.149 1.487 0.981 1.806 0.156 24.296 
Productive 
asset index 
0-25th -0.279 0.011 -0.374 -0.276 -0.276 0.000 -0.276 -0.276 
26-50th -0.255 0.019 -0.272 -0.232 -0.250 0.011 -0.262 -0.235 
51-75th -0.142 0.057 -0.225 -0.023 -0.163 0.053 -0.231 -0.015 
76-100th 0.145 0.153 0.006 0.541 0.738 1.864 -0.004 27.824 
Table 3. Asset index summary statistics, by percentile and year 
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 Duration pre 1/2005 (months) Duration post 1/2005 (months) 
Age of respondent 8.163 2.633** 
 (8.436) (0.619) 
Age, squared -0.091 -0.033** 
 (0.087) (0.004) 
Gender is female -140.867** -54.667** 
 (46.989) (14.540) 
Highest level of schooling: 
primary school 32.108 -12.289 
 (29.549) (14.987) 
Highest level of schooling: 
middle school 38.206* -4.588 
 (18.904) (14.962) 
Highest level of schooling: high 
school 39.681* -20.352 
 (16.053) (13.747) 
Household members 4.991 1.687 
 (6.263) (0.945) 
Household members of working 
age (18-50) -5.667 -3.922** 
 (9.081) (1.403) 
Years of residence in village 0.201 -0.135** 
 (0.192) (0.046) 
Social network 10.395 2.065 
 (5.944) (1.524) 
Pokrom 141.307** 83.025** 
 (16.098) (8.193) 
Darmang 134.675** 31.191* 
 (22.518) (12.633) 
Oboadaka 134.294** 69.771** 
 (20.541) (5.510) 
Min pH -35.774** -8.707 
 (9.260) (6.659) 
Min organic matter 16.820 0.755 
 (11.150) (5.017) 
Constant -176.733 -31.455 
 (113.648) (42.180) 
N 162 
Table 4. First stage - bivariate tobit with village clustered standard errors (in 
parentheses). 
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; standard errors in parenthesis 
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Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Duration pre 1/2005 517 33.00 66.40 0 428 
Duration pre 1/2005 (months), predicted 529 16.57 36.53 0 234 
Duration post 1/2005 525 7.20 17.33 0 56 
Duration post 1/2005 (months), predicted 529 4.21 12.46 0 64 
Table 5. Summary statistics of observed and predicted pre- and post-2005 duration 
variables (months) 
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 Asset index Productive asset index 
Livestock asset 
index 
Consumer 
durables asset 
index 
Duration pre 
1/2005 (months) 0.015 -0.005 0.016 0.065 
 (0.032) (0.020) (0.041) (0.100) 
Duration post 
1/2005 (months) -0.191 -0.032 -0.247 -0.635 
 (0.449) (0.273) (0.569) (1.383) 
Duration post 
1/2005 (months), 
squared 
0.004 0.001 0.005 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.026) 
Age -0.011 -0.003 -0.010 -0.032 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.047) (0.114) 
Highest level of 
schooling: primary 
school 
-0.099 -0.064 -0.248 0.116 
 (0.344) (0.210) (0.436) (1.060) 
Highest level of 
schooling: middle 
school 
-0.002 0.028 -0.087 0.047 
 (0.378) (0.230) (0.479) (1.164) 
Highest level of 
schooling: high 
school 
-0.279 -0.177 -0.267 -0.617 
 (0.541) (0.329) (0.685) (1.664) 
Household 
members -0.028 -0.013 -0.028 -0.119 
 (0.109) (0.066) (0.138) (0.336) 
Household 
members of 
working age (18-
50) 
0.027 -0.001 0.039 0.111 
 (0.096) (0.058) (0.122) (0.295) 
Number of villagers 
whom respondent 
knows personally 
0.005 0.001 0.007 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) 
Constant 0.220 0.035 0.453 0.765 
 (1.086) (0.661) (1.377) (3.345) 
Sigma u 1.83 1.67 1.90 2.70 
Sigma e 0.74 0.45 0.94 2.28 
Rho 0.86 0.93 0.80 0.58 
N 440 440 440 440 
Table 6. Effect of instrumented duration on asset index 
Notes: Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Other controls include “duration 
pre 1/2005 (months), squared” and “age squared” which are not statistically significantly 
different from 0, so are omitted from the table above. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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 Asset index (IV, FE) Asset index (IV, RE) 
Asset index – IV, only 
data with obs in both 
years 
Duration pre 1/2005 
(months) 0.015 0.017 0.015 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.032) 
Duration post 1/2005 
(months) -0.191 -0.211 -0.191 
 (0.449) (0.285) (0.449) 
Duration post 1/2005 
(months), squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Age -0.011 -0.003 -0.011 
 (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) 
Highest level of 
schooling: primary 
school 
-0.099 -0.058 -0.099 
 (0.344) (0.243) (0.344) 
Highest level of 
schooling: middle school -0.002 0.015 -0.002 
 (0.378) (0.257) (0.378) 
Highest level of 
schooling: high school -0.279 -0.119 -0.279 
 (0.541) (0.331) (0.541) 
Household members -0.028 -0.037 -0.028 
 (0.109) (0.068) (0.109) 
Household members of 
working age (18-50) 0.027 0.037 0.027 
 (0.096) (0.065) (0.096) 
Number of villagers 
whom respondent knows 
personally 
0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Female respondent  -0.072  
  (0.357)  
Constant 0.220 0.081 0.232 
 (1.086) (0.701) (1.098) 
N 440 440 404 
Table 7. Robustness checks 
Notes: Other controls include “duration pre 1/2005 (months), squared” and “age squared” 
which are not statistically significantly different from 0, so are omitted from the table 
above output. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.  
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Initial 
(1998) 
wealth 
percentile 
n 
Early adopter Late adopter 
Nonadopter Early 
disadopter 
Late 
disadopter 
Early 
disadopter 
Late 
disadopter 
Asset index 
0-25th 99 -0.289 -5.775 -2.090 -7.577 -0.261 
26-50th 105 -0.166 -5.653 -1.968 -7.454 -0.139 
51-75th 123 0.065 -5.421 -1.736 -7.223 0.093 
76-100th 127 0.143 -5.343 -1.658 -7.144 0.171 
Durables 
asset index 
0-25th 179 0.884 -17.429 -6.816 -25.129 -0.712 
26-50th 42 1.056 -17.257 -6.644 -24.957 -0.540 
51-75th 122 1.602 -16.711 -6.098 -24.411 0.006 
76-100th 111 1.630 -16.683 -6.070 -24.383 0.034 
Livestock 
asset index 
0-25th 81 -0.421 -7.556 -2.343 -9.478 0.036 
26-50th 97 -0.392 -7.527 -2.313 -9.448 0.065 
51-75th 133 -0.172 -7.307 -2.094 -9.229 0.285 
76-100th 143 -0.091 -7.226 -2.013 -9.148 0.366 
Productive 
asset index 
0-25th 188 -1.005 -1.899 -0.437 -1.330 -0.139 
26-50th 33 -0.955 -1.848 -0.386 -1.280 -0.088 
51-75th 106 -0.887 -1.781 -0.319 -1.213 -0.021 
76-100th 127 -0.874 -1.768 -0.306 -1.200 -0.008 
Table 8. Average welfare for categories of farmers, by wealth precentile.  
 
Notes: Early adoption is defined as farmers adopting ten years prior to the shock 
(1/2005). Late adoption is defined as farmers adopting the year of the shock (1/2005). 
Early disadoption is defined as farmers disadopting 10 months after the shock; late 
disadoption is defined as farmers disadopting 40 months after the shock. *** Differences 
between early adopters/early disadopters and nonadopters are statistically significant at 
the 1 % level for all indices and percentile groups. Differences between early adopters/ 
late disadopters and late adopters/early disadopters are statistically significant at the 1 % 
level for all indices and percentile groups. Differences between early adopters/late 
disadopters and late adopters/late disadopters are statistically significant at the 1 % level 
for all indices and percentile groups.  
! 111!
11. Appendices 
 
A. Factor summary statistics 
Productive Assets: mean std. dev. min max 
Barrel 0.309 1.086 0 19 
Chain saw 0.015 0.160 0 3 
Corn mill 0.004 0.071 0 2 
Cutlass 0.975 3.833 0 118 
Gallon container 0.004 0.098 0 3 
Hammer 0.195 0.506 0 4 
Hoe 0.245 1.011 0 26 
Knapsack 0.029 0.236 0 4 
Mattock 0.018 0.161 0 2 
Mist blower 0.226 1.740 0 53 
Pick axe 0.032 0.935 0 30 
Pump 0.012 0.206 0 6 
Rake 0.005 0.082 0 2 
Saw 0.016 0.224 0 4 
Shovel 0.005 0.082 0 2 
Sprayer 0.070 0.345 0 5 
Livestock assets:   
  
  
Cows (f) 0.101 2.675 0 85 
Goats, kids (f) 0.492 1.251 0 14 
Goats, kids (m) 0.370 0.918 0 9 
Goats, adults (f) 1.547 2.867 0 35 
Goats, adults (m) 0.501 1.871 0 50 
Lambs (f) 0.240 0.874 0 12 
Lambs (m) 0.204 0.678 0 6 
Sheep (f) 0.955 2.517 0 28 
Sheep (m) 0.295 0.990 0 13 
Chickens, broilers) 0.577 1.469 0 11 
Chickens, broilers) 1.063 11.067 0 250 
Chickens, layers (f) 1.184 2.903 0 24 
Chickens, layers (m) 1.092 2.754 0 24 
Chickens, local (f) 2.576 5.100 0 68 
Chickens, local (m) 1.405 2.576 0 27 
Cows (m) 0.018 0.423 0 13 
Ducks (f) 0.245 1.561 0 24 
Ducks (m) 0.180 1.210 0 23 
Guinea pigs (f) 0.091 0.966 0 25 
Guinea pigs (m) 0.054 0.503 0 11 
Pigs adults (f) 0.072 0.623 0 15 
Pigs adults (m) 0.041 0.628 0 18 
Piglets (f) 0.010 0.130 0 2 
Piglets (m) 0.010 0.144 0 3 
Rabbits (f) 0.055 0.603 0 10 
Rabbits (m) 0.032 0.396 0 8 
Durable assets:   
  
  
Bicycle 0.065 0.260 0 2 
Car 0.044 0.252 0 4 
Fan 0.126 0.459 0 5 
Generator 0.261 5.201 0 167 
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Gun 0.043 0.227 0 2 
Radio 0.442 0.657 0 4 
Refrigerator 0.109 0.338 0 3 
Sewing machine 0.282 0.478 0 3 
Television 0.225 0.501 0 6 
Year is 2009 0.600 0.490 0 1 
 
B. Estimated factor loadings 
 
All assets Durable assets 
Livestock 
assets 
Productive 
assets 
 
1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 
Barrel 0.710 0.721         0.816 0.825 
Chain saw 0.382 0.393         0.428 0.443 
Corn mill -0.001 0.034         0.016 0.052 
Cutlass 0.932 0.933         0.935 0.935 
Gallon container 0.000 0.039         0.006 0.022 
Hammer 0.338 0.341         0.379 0.380 
Hoe 0.870 0.898         0.922 0.944 
Knapsack 0.059 0.091         0.110 0.147 
Mattock 0.002 0.048         0.004 0.047 
Mist blower 0.914 0.916         0.929 0.930 
Pick axe 0.023 0.023         0.033 0.033 
Pump 0.085 0.083         0.088 0.089 
Rake 0.016 0.030         0.071 0.094 
Saw 0.031 0.042         0.077 0.087 
Shovel 0.023 0.044         0.060 0.086 
Sprayer -0.049 0.036         -0.050 0.049 
Cows (f) 0.885 0.886     0.774 0.774     
Goats, kids (f) 0.298 0.582     0.412 0.674     
Goats, kids (m) 0.211 0.467     0.337 0.578     
Goats, adults (f) 0.210 0.555     0.337 0.640     
Goats, adults (m) 0.133 0.492     0.205 0.560     
Lambs (f) 0.428 0.731     0.536 0.793     
Lambs (m) 0.277 0.612     0.416 0.723     
Sheep (f) 0.222 0.558     0.373 0.678     
Sheep (m) 0.231 0.562     0.361 0.661     
Chickens, broilers (f) -0.096 0.038     -0.064 0.028     
Chickens, broilers (m) 0.136 0.151     0.198 0.209     
Chickens, layers (f) -0.100 0.034     -0.059 0.049     
Chickens, layers (m) -0.114 0.031     -0.070 0.063     
Chickens, local (f) 0.610 0.626     0.700 0.706     
Chickens, local (m) 0.506 0.579     0.590 0.648     
Cows (m) 0.886 0.886     0.774 0.774     
Ducks (f) 0.003 0.031     0.041 0.044     
Ducks (m) -0.004 0.036     0.035 0.052     
Guinea pigs (f) 0.044 0.049     0.081 0.082     
Guinea pigs (m) 0.041 0.059     0.082 0.093     
Pigs adults (f) 0.013 0.071     0.054 0.141     
Pigs adults (m) 0.046 0.064     0.119 0.142     
Piglets (f) 0.001 0.006     -0.021 -0.019     
Piglets (m) 0.011 0.017     -0.015 -0.012     
Rabbits (f) 0.125 0.170     0.146 0.190     
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Rabbits (m) 0.089 0.188     0.109 0.210     
Bicycle 0.177 0.180 0.372 0.379         
Car 0.539 0.624 0.545 0.628         
Fan 0.414 0.416 0.770 0.772         
Generator 0.888 0.888 0.470 0.471         
Gun -0.042 0.011 -0.082 0.035         
Radio 0.433 0.437 0.694 0.699         
Refrigerator 0.487 0.488 0.783 0.785         
Sewing machine 0.052 0.111 0.018 0.095         
Television 0.405 0.416 0.815 0.829         
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CHAPTER 4 
 
POVERTY RATES AND THE RETURNS TO FERTILIZER: 
EMPIRICAL AND SIMULATION EVIDENCE FROM MALAWI1!
 
1. Introduction 
While Asia’s Green Revolution resulted in a doubling of average yields for staple 
crops over the 1960s-70s, Africa’s agricultural productivity has lagged behind. Several 
African governments promoted fertilizer use during the 1970s and early 1980s, e.g., 
through direct subsidies, input credit programs, centralized fertilizer procurement and 
distribution sites, etc., with some success (Denning et al. 2009). However, there was a 
general phase out of input subsidy programs in the 1990s, primarily due to fiscal 
constraints or inefficiency. Following severe weather events and/or the 2007-2008 food 
price crisis, however, several African countries reintroduced yield-increasing policies in 
the 2000s (Kelly et al. 2011). For example, Malawi suffered a severe drought in 2004-5, 
resulting in approximately 4.2 million people, or 38% of its population, requiring food 
aid (Denning et al. 2009). As a result, the government reinstated a subsidized fertilizer 
program. Aggregate maize production doubled in 2006, then tripled in 2007, going from 
a 43% national deficit in 2005 to a 53% surplus in 2007 (Denning et al. 2009). In a nation 
where in 2005 inhabitants consumed approximately 1,193 kcal worth of maize per day 
and grew maize on approximately 40% of cultivated land (FAOSTAT 2005), the 
fertilizer subsidy scheme’s apparent success in dramatically improving Malawi’s food 
security attracted widespread attention and helped turn fertilizer subsidies into a high-
level political issue, not just in Malawi but throughout Africa. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Written by Aurélie P. Harou, Yanyan Liu, Christopher B. Barrett and Liangzhi You !
! 115!
Despite the Malawi fertilizer program’s seeming success, some have criticized its 
high cost, starting in 2005-2006 at US$ 50 million, and growing to US$265 million 
during the 2008-2009 growing season, due in part to soaring global fertilizer prices 
(Chibwana et al. 2012, Dorward and Chiwra 2011). Others have criticized it as an 
unwarranted public subsidy of fundamentally private goods.2 Still others express doubts 
as to how much of Malawi’s recent maize yield gains can be attributed to its fertilizer 
subsidy program, the introduction of which fortuitously coincided with several years’ 
favorable growing conditions (Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2009). Furthermore, there is some 
evidence that while subsidies may have increased crop yields, poverty levels have 
remained the same, raising questions about the program’s efficacy in reducing poverty 
and food insecurity (Chapoto et al. 2011).  
In this study, we use econometric and simulation analysis of a large-scale, 
nationwide panel of plot-level experimental data to disentangle the productivity impacts 
of Malawi’s fertilizer subsidy program from those of favorable weather while accounting 
for the country’s heterogeneous soil conditions and pest pressures. We begin by 
estimating a maize production function using experimental agronomic trial data merged 
with detailed soils and weather data.  Randomized assignment of fertilizer applications 
combined with detailed agronomic controls enable us to identify the causal effects of 
fertilizer application on maize yields. We then use the estimated maize production 
function and historical climate data to generate spatially explicit estimates of the 
distribution of the expected marginal profitability of fertilizer use in the face of stochastic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See, for example, the comments by the World Bank’s Chief Economist for the Africa 
Region, Shanta Devarajan, at http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/fertilizer-subsidies-in-
malawi, and associated responses. 
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weather, given prevailing maize and fertilizer prices during the subsidy era. Finally, we 
correlate those results with spatially disaggregated estimates of headcount poverty rates 
so as to establish whether yield gains reasonably attributable to fertilizer subsidies accrue 
primarily in poorer or richer areas of the country. 
We find that given 2009-2010 maize and fertilizer prices, the fertilizer bundle 
recommended under Malawi’s Agricultural Input Subsidy Program is almost always and 
everywhere profitable in expectation. Indeed, fertilizer use would remain profitable in 
expectation even in the face of significant fertilizer price increases and drought year 
conditions. While the program does appear to favorably affect maize yields and farm 
profits, however, the spatial pattern of those gains is largely uncorrelated with headcount 
poverty rates, calling into question the extent to which Malawi’s fertilizer subsidies have 
been pro-poor. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature on fertilizer application rates and reviews Malawi’s subsidy program. Section 3 
describes our data and provides summary statistics. Section 4 estimates the quadratic 
production function and Section 5 calculates the expected returns to fertilizer and 
expected marginal benefit to cost ratios. Section 6 explores the spatial correlation of the 
expected returns to fertilizer estimates with headcount poverty levels. Finally, Section 7 
discusses our results and Section 8 concludes with some policy recommendations. 
 
2. Background 
Much of the recent economic literature regarding fertilizer use in African 
agriculture has tried to understand the relatively low observed fertilizer adoption rates 
! 117!
among smallholder farmers and the variability in fertilizer use over seasons despite high 
expected payoffs (Duflo et al. 2011, Marenya and Barrett 2009a,b, Suri 2009, Duflo et al. 
2008). This puzzle is partially explained by the observed and unobserved heterogeneity 
among both farmer attributes (e.g., patience, skill) and soil characteristics that make 
different levels of fertilizer profitable or not (Foltz et al. 2011). For example, Marenya 
and Barrett (2009a,b) show that fertilizer yield responses vary with soil organic matter 
content, making fertilizer application less profitable on poorer quality soils, and that 
farmer fertilizer application behavior responds accordingly. Finally, highly volatile 
fertilizer and crop prices make the profitability of fertilizer application vary with prices, 
over space and time and may induce risk-averse farmers to forego fertilizer use (Dercon 
and Christiaensen 2011, Morris et al. 2007). 
One way in which policy makers have responded to low adoption levels is by 
subsidizing farmer’s fertilizer purchases. Conventional subsidies stimulate demand by 
lowering the price faced by private buyers, but the gains often accrue disproportionately 
to suppliers rather than farmers, given relatively price inelastic supply and price elastic 
demand. Universal subsidies have been/are implemented in several West African 
countries, including Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria and Ghana. Several countries 
in East and Southern Africa, including Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia, 
have implemented subsidy programs using vouchers distributed to targeted farmers, who 
redeem them at participating retailers for fertilizer at a subsidized price. The retailers in 
turn redeem the vouchers from the government for the full commercial price. The success 
of voucher schemes depends largely on their implementation, with the possibility of 
fraud, leakage and delay. Furthermore, they can be costly to implement. When optimally 
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implemented, however, targeted subsidy programs may benefit smallholders (Druihe and 
Barreiro-Hurle 2012).  
Malawi’s Agricultural Input Subsidy Program (AISP) has distributed vouchers for 
fertilizer, hybrid or OPV seeds and/or pesticides at reduced prices since 2005; the 
program continues today. Recipients receive vouchers for one 50 kg bag of basal 
fertilizer and one 50 kg bag of urea (to cover approximately 1 hectare of land)3. The 
subsidy covered between 64 to 91 % of the cost of fertilizer between 2005-2010, 
changing from year to year. In 2007-2008, for example, recipients paid 6.75 $ while the 
government paid 24.50 $ per 50 kg bag of fertilizer, representing 78.4 % subsidization 
(Doward and Chirwa 2011). Initially, open pollinated variety (OPV) maize seeds were 
distributed but were subsequently replaced predominantly by hybrid maize varieties. In 
2007-2008, AISP also distributed cotton and legume seeds, and in 2008-2009 it also 
distributed tea and coffee fertilizers. The 2005-2006 program and subsequent program 
years distributed vouchers to approximately 50% of the farmers in the country. Doward 
and Chiwra (2011) and Doward et al. (2008) contain more details on Malawi’s AISP. 
The Ministry of Agriculture of Malawi distributes coupons to districts and 
traditional authorities that allocate them to villages. Village heads and village 
development committees identify recipient households targeting vulnerable households 
(especially children and women headed households) that grow maize and/or tobacco and 
who otherwise could not afford to purchase fertilizer (Doward et al. 2008). Field reports 
find that in practice, there was significant variation in selection criteria, number of 
coupon recipients and number of coupons per recipient between villages and over time. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The average farm in Malawi is 1.12 ha. Farm sizes tend to be smaller in the south where 
the population density and poverty levels are higher (Holden and Lunduka 2012). 
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Unofficial criteria such as social networks, e.g., relationships to village leaders, and the 
duration of stay of a household in the village were likely to have affected the allocation of 
vouchers to recipients (Doward and Chirwa 2011, Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011, Holden and 
Lunduka 2010, Doward et al. 2008). Indeed, Rickert-Gilbert et al. (2011) find that male-
headed households with higher assets and more land received more subsidized fertilizer. 
Many farmers in Malawi began to grow hybrid maize using an average of 97 kg 
DAP and 175 kg urea per hectare in the 1980s (the equivalent of 96 kg N and 40 kg 
phosphate in nutrients), as recommended by extension agents (Benson 1999b). However, 
due to the diversity in climate and soils throughout Malawi, the blanket rates were not 
profitable for all farmers; in particular, adding rates of phosphate greater than 20kg/ha did 
not raise yields at some sites (Benson 1999b).  As a result, the Ministry of Agriculture 
called for fertilizer verification trials to determine which fertilizer combinations would be 
best suited to different soil types throughout Malawi. A group called the Maize 
Productivity Task Force (MPTF) (Snapp et al. 2010, Benson 1999a) undertook this task. 
With technical assistance from the International Food Policy and Research Institute and 
funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, MPTF collected yield and soil data over two 
seasons in 1995-1996 and 1997-1998. 
Beginning in 1998-1999, the MPTF implemented trials comparing cropping 
systems including legumes and fertilized maize. Indeed, fertilizer application is but one 
way of addressing soil deficiencies. Foltz et al. (2011) suggests that returns to fertilizer 
may be greater when combined with complementary practices, such as using improved 
seeds, irrigating, weeding more frequently, etc. Snapp et al. (2010) find that N fertilizer 
efficiency and stability of maize yield response can be optimized when maize 
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monoculture is broken down with shrubby crop legume such as the semi-perennial 
pigeonpea (Cajanus cajan) or viney legume mucuna (Mucuna pruriens) which have high 
N-fixing capacity. Even across different soil types, they find that rotating maize with 
semi-perennials yielded 38-67 kg grain/kg N versus 24-31 kg grain/kg N in monoculture 
maize. In some cases, improving soil organic matter by adopting conservation farming 
techniques, e.g., reducing soil disturbance, adding manure, ridging to trap/focus water 
drainage, intercropping or rotating legumes, may be more cost effective in addressing 
micronutrient deficiencies than fertilizers altogether.4 
Chibwana et al. (2012) measure the impact of Malawi’s AISP on cropland 
allocation decisions and find a positive correlation between participation in the program 
and the amount of land planted with maize and tobacco and a negative correlation with 
land to other crops. The authors conclude that the subsidy program therefore promoted 
the monoculture of crops, thereby increasing farmer risk (growing maize instead of more 
drought-resistant crops, e.g., cassava and potato) and decreasing soil fertility, but 
reducing forest pressure. Holden and Lunduka (2012) assess the impacts of Malawi’s 
AISP on the use of manure. Continuous application of N-fertilizer has been shown to lead 
to more acidic soils, which can be mitigated by the application of organic manure. They 
find that a 1 % increase in fertilizer use is associated with a 1.94%-1.96% increase in 
manure for farmers not receiving fertilizer vouchers and a 0.62%-1.66% increase for  
fertilizer voucher recipients. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Some conservation agriculture techniques are more difficult to adopt given the use of 
herbicides that can have long-term toxic effects on legumes (Snapp et al. 2010). A farmer 
must assess the tradeoff between applying herbicides to kill weeds that compete with 
maize for N and associated labor costs with weeding. !
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The stated goal of fertilizer subsidy programs is often to both reduce poverty and 
increase production (Kelly et al. 2011). However, achieving both objectives appears 
difficult. While targeting better off farmers may result in higher yields due to their 
superior access to fertile land, seasonal financing to purchase complementary inputs, 
skill, etc., subsidizing the better off also results in a higher crowding out effect of 
commercial fertilizer (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne 2013, Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, if the gains from subsidies accrue primarily to better-off farmers, or in 
better-off regions of the country, then one necessarily relies on national, rather than local, 
food and labor markets to propagate the gains to the poor (Minten and Barrett 2008).  So 
the spatial pattern of yield gains may matter to the poverty reduction effects of fertilizer 
subsidy schemes. 
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
The data used in this study come from multiple sources. We use field trial data 
from on-farm experiments conducted by the MPTF in 1995-1996 and 1997-1998. Six 
treatments of different fertilizer bundles were randomly assigned across 1,677 sites 
nationwide in 1995-1996, while experiments with four of those treatments were repeated 
on 1,407 sites in 1997-1998, with 1,205 overlapping sites across the two years (Table 3). 
Farmers selected field sites on which fertilizer had not been applied and that had been 
fallow for at least two years. The 1997-1998 trials were in the same location as the 1995-
1996 trials, but not at the exact same site, so as to ensure that the preceding treatments 
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did not affect subsequent trial’s yields (Figure 1)5. The sites were managed and led by 
local farmers who were trained by regional field assistants (FAs) to manage the 
experiment sites. The FA hosted two field days with local farmers at each site. The first 
was planned for when the maize was fully grown, but still green, and the second occurred 
after harvest when the grain yield had been weighed. The FAs collected several types of 
data including soil samples, farmer comments, crop growth stage dates, incidence of pest 
attack, and harvest data (Sauer and Tschale 2009, Benson 1999). 
The different treatments were conducted on 4-6 (depending on the year) adjacent 
trial plots at one site, each plot measuring 6.3 m x 9 m, consisting of seven ridges spaced 
90 cm apart. The net harvest plot size was five full ridge lengths, or 1/247 ha (0.00405 
ha). The basal application of fertilizer was done before planting using the banding 
method. Two different maize varieties were used. The shorter duration hybrid, MH18, 
was planted at about two-thirds of all sites – those in lowland areas and in rain-shadow 
areas in the uplands. The taller, longer duration hybrid, MH17, was planted at the 
remaining sites. The maize was planted at a rate of three seeds per station, with planting 
stations spaced 75 cm along the ridge. The top-dressing application of fertilizer was done 
by the banding method when the maize had reached 45 cm in height. Plots were weeded 
at least twice (Sauer and Tschale 2009, Benson 1999). 
To control for soil heterogeneity that may affect the marginal physical product of 
fertilizer on maize, we use soil maps generated by the Land Resources Conservation 
Board at the Ministry of Agriculture in Malawi in collaboration with FAO and UNDP in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 We use location to refer to the same geographic area at which one or more site was 
chosen at which to perform the field experiments. Therefore, up to two different sites 
(one for the 1995-1996 trials and one for the 1997-1998 trials) were chosen at one 
location. 
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the 1980s and 1990s (Eschweiler et al. 1991). The maps contain soil characteristics, 
including soil type, slope, cation exchange capacity, soil N, P and K content. Given the 
proximity in location of the trial plots both seasons, we can reasonably assume that the 
sites shared similar agro-ecological characteristics, although there is surely still 
unobserved plot-level variation in soil conditions. Nonetheless, we can estimate the 
marginal impact of fertilizer on maize yields because application rates were randomized 
across plots, plot management standardized, and we can control for a host of agronomic 
conditions that might affect the marginal physical product of fertilizer. 
Tables 1-3 contain summary statistics from the 1,891 plot trials and soil map data. 
As expected, yields increase with the N, phosphate and sulphur (S) contents of a fertilizer 
application. Interestingly, treatment 5 leads to statistically significantly higher (at the 1% 
level) mean yields than treatment 6, which has a higher N and phosphate content but no 
S. Yields in 1995-1996 were statistically significantly higher (at the 1 % level) than 
yields in 1997-1998 for each treatment. 
Table 2 shows the mean striga and termite infestation by year at each site, as 
reported by farmers overseeing the plots. Farmers were asked to observe whether the site 
was infested by striga, differentiating between infestation on less than 50 % of planting 
stations (some infestation) or more than 50% (high striga infestation). Between 21-28% 
(6-7%) of sites suffered moderate (high) infestation each year. Termites were observed 
on approximately 40% of sites in both years6.  We have no reason to believe that pest 
infestation rates are endogenous to the fertilizer treatments. Finally, table 3 shows the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Pest infestation is not chronic: the correlation between striga infestation between both 
years is 0.19; the correlation between high striga infestation is 0.12 between both years; 
and the correlation between termite infestation is 0.10 between both years. 
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mean soil characteristics for each site. The terrain is flat (steep) on 48 (3) % of sites. The 
soil is on average acidic. 
We also control for climate variability by using daily rainfall and temperature 
time series data from 23 weather stations scattered throughout Malawi as collected by the 
Malawi Meteorological Service (Figure 2). Malawi has a diverse agroecology with 55 
natural regions. The precipitation pattern is unimodal with 4-6 months of rain falling 
approximately between December and April, followed by a long dry season (Holden and 
Lunduka 2010, Gilbert et al. 2002). The first year of available rainfall data differs by 
district, ranging between 1903-1976, and ending in 2009 for all districts. The temperature 
data also differ in start year, ranging between 1956 and 1984 and ending between 2002 
and 2008. Experimental field sites were linked to weather stations based on the matching 
district and weather station name (a future iteration will create a weighted average of 
rainfall and temperature based on a site’s proximity to the 2-3 closest weather stations). 
Following the methodology used and described in Lobell et al.’s (2011) study of 
how growing conditions affect maize production in sub-Saharan Africa, we build three 
weather indices to control for temperature and rainfall. First, we calculate the number of 
growing degree days (GDD) between 8 and 30 degrees Celsius to predict maize 
development rates. Second, we calculate the number of growing degree days above 30 
degrees Celsius to control for high temperatures that might harm maize growth. Finally, 
we calculate the total precipitation for the 21-day period centered on the silking date, to 
control for anthesis -- the period when maize flowers and is particularly susceptible to 
drought. Appendix A includes a more thorough description of the construction of these 
indices. Figure 3 shows these weather indices from 1972 to 2004. As expected, a high 
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GDD 30+ index corresponds with past drought years, notably seasons 1982-1983, 1991-
1992, and 1994-1995. Figure 3 also includes total maize yields (http://faostat.fao.org, 
2013). High GDD 30+ index and low precipitation years are, as expected, generally 
accompanied by low maize yields. 
District-level median fertilizer prices were calculated from the agriculture module 
data in the World Bank’s 2010 LSMS third Integrated Household Survey for Malawi7. In 
the surveys, respondents were asked the quantity and value of unsubsidized fertilizer 
purchased. The following analysis, therefore, examines the market cost of fertilizer, not 
the subsidized cost to farmers or the cost to the government. District-level median maize 
prices were calculated using the Ministry of Agriculture’s monthly maize prices between 
December 2009 and March 2010. Median maize and fertilizer prices (MK/kg) are 
summarized in Table 4. The fertilizer prices for DAP are highest, followed by NPK and 
urea. 
Finally, we use IFPRI’s HarvestChoice poverty headcount rate map showing the 
percent of the population living below $1.25 per capita/day in purchasing power parity at 
the 2005 reference year 8 . These maps were prepared using Malawi’s nationally 
representative 2004-2005 Integrated Household Survey 9 . Poverty estimates were 
rasterized to a 5 arc-minute grid where poverty rates are assumed uniform across grid 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTLSM
S/EXTSURAGRI/0,,contentMDK:23156208~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSit
ePK:7420261,00.html 
8 Available at http://harvestchoice.org/maps/poverty-headcount-ratio-below-05-ppp-
125day-percent-2005. For more technical details, see 
http://harvestchoice.org/labs/readme_poverty.  
9 Available at http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php/publications/integrated-household-
survey.html 
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cells. We obtain estimated poverty levels for each trial site by creating a continuous 
rasterized map based on the 5 arc-minute grid cells using a kriging interpolation method 
in ArcGIS10. Poverty headcount ranges between 55 – 93 % for the trial sites. We 
ultimately estimate the correlation between these spatially explicit estimates of poverty 
rates and our spatially-explicit estimates of the expected marginal benefit/cost ratio for 
fertilizer application.  
 
4. Maize production function estimation 
We first estimate a production function with the experimental data described 
above, following methods used in other, recent econometric studies of fertilizer’s site-
specific impact on maize yields (Maine et al. 2007, Liu et al. 2006, Anselin et al. 2004, 
Berck et al. 2000, Babcock and Pautsch 1998, Mjelde et al. 1991). In particular, we 
estimate a generalized quadratic production function of the form 
 !!"# = !!! + ! !!!!"#$! + ! !!"!!"#$!!"#$!! + !! + !! + !!"# 
 
where ykit represents the yield for treatment k on site i in year t, 0, w and wv are the 
parameters of interest, i is a site-level fixed effect, t is a year-specific effect,  xkitw,v 
represents all variables (indexed by v and w) potentially affecting yields – nutrient 
amounts, soil characteristics, temperature and rainfall – and kit represents the iid, mean 
zero, normally distributed regression error. More specifically, we control for site-specific !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Poverty headcount rates are interpolated using an ordinary kriging method that relies 
on a spherical semivariogram model.  
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field characteristics, i.e., whether the site was infested by striga or termites, as well as 
site-level soil quality characteristics extracted from national soil maps, i.e., the slope, soil 
texture, pH, cation exchange capacity (CEC), and N, P and potassium (K) contents, and 
climate using the indices described above and in more detail in Appendix A. We control 
for year/season-specific effects by including a dummy variable for the 1995-1996 
observations. Any remaining omitted variables are assumed to be orthogonal to the 
remaining unobserved error component,  i +  kit. Standard errors are robust to 
clustering at the site-level in order to correct for any site-level correlation among 
observations. 
The nutrients applied to the field trial sites are as explained above, N, S and 
phosphate. In sub-humid environments like Malawi, N is known to be the main driver of 
cereal yield response in soils with low organic matter. However, applying only N as 
fertilizer (in the form of urea) can lead to S and P deficiencies in the longer term. K is 
less deficient in Malawi soils except perhaps when cultivating very high yielding 
tobacco. Zinc and other micronutrients also contribute to soil fertility, but are rarely 
deficient except perhaps in small, localized areas of Malawi (Benson 1999a,b). Chilimba 
and Liwimbi (2008) do conclude, however, that generally basal dressing including zinc 
and/or K is superior to a basal application without them.  
Although both S and phosphate are known to contribute to maize yields, we 
cannot control for both because there is insufficient variation between treatments. 
Because S more consistently showed yield responses than P in the field trials, NPK 
23:21:0+4S was promoted as the basal dressing in Malawi’s AISP. We therefore choose 
to control for N and S in the production function estimation. 
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The panel data are unbalanced, but the field trial site selection in 1997-1998 was 
random and therefore the remaining unobservables should be uncorrelated with the 
regressors. Because we are interested in the marginal effects of fertilizer, we demean the 
data to make the interpretation of the coefficients more straightforward. The full 
regression estimation results are reported in Appendix B. A Hausman test confirms that 
the random effects model, shown in column I, is consistent and efficient.  
As expected, N and S have a statistically significant positive effect on yields that 
diminishes with the application rate. The interaction of N with S is also statistically 
significantly positive, indicating that each is limiting, leading to complementarities in 
combining the two nutrients. The estimated marginal yield effect of N fertilizer also 
varies statistically significantly with weather, increasing (decreasing) with precipitation 
(GDD over 30). Likewise, the marginal yield effects of S vary statistically significantly 
with soil P content and slope. The clear implication is that the marginal returns to 
fertilizer vary predictably across growing seasons and over space, so that any benefits of 
Malawi’s subsidy program will necessarily be uneven. The key questions are how big are 
those benefits, how unevenly are they spread, and is that variation progressive 
(regressive), that is, are the marginal gains to additional fertilizer application positively 
(negatively) correlated with poverty headcount rates?  
The coefficient estimates on the other control variables are as one would expect. 
Consistent with Table 1 and Figure 3, the regression estimates also indicate that yields in 
the 1995-1996 season were higher. Independently, the GDD 8-30 index and rainfall both 
have a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effect on yields, while GDD 30+ has a 
negative and significant effect. Yields were higher with the shorter stature MH18 hybrid 
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variety and in higher pH soils, since most of Malawi’s farm land is moderately to mildly 
acidic. High levels of striga and termite infestation and steeply sloped sandy soils are 
associated with lower yields. Overall, the regression does a reasonably good job of 
explaining variation in maize yields. 
We ran robustness checks on these estimates using both a Hausman-Taylor 
estimator (model II in Appendix B), which allows some of the regressors to be correlated 
with the unobserved individual effect, ηi, and a random effects model estimated only on 
the balanced panel subset of data observed in both years (model III). The results are 
generally quite consistent across specifications, especially as regards the central 
parameters of interest relating to the marginal effects of fertilizer application on maize 
output. The sign of the effect differs for the second order effects of pH where it is 
negative (as expected) for model I but positive in models II and III. 
 
5. The estimated returns to fertilizer 
Given the estimated maize production function, we can estimate the expected 
marginal physical returns of fertilizer.  The expected marginal physical returns to 
fertilizer, ![!"!], equals the sum of the marginal products of each element in the 
fertilizer, N and S, multiplied by the percent of the nutrients in the specific fertilizer: 
   E[!"!] = !!! !"!" !" + !! !"!" !"     (2) 
For example, NPK (23:21:0+4S) contains 23 % N, 21 % P, 0 % K and 4 % S, so !!= 
23% and !!= 4% while urea contains 46% N so that !!= 46% and !!= 0%. Given the 
estimation results from equation (1), the expected marginal return to fertilizer f is: ![!"!] = !!!(!! + Σ!!!"!!"#$)+ !!(!! + Σ!!!"!!"#$)  (3) 
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The expected marginal returns are a function of multiple terms, including interactions 
with a host of variables that vary across space and time.  
The second and third columns of Table 4 report the estimated marginal returns of 
NPK (the fertilizer included in the starter pack) and urea. The mean marginal return is 
higher for urea. Had we been able to control and estimate the marginal returns from 
phosphate, however, the marginal returns for NPK might be higher, as we implicitly put 
zero value on the P since S appears more limiting. Furthermore, as explained above, 
while the application of urea may increase yields in the short term it would likely lead to 
the depletion of other nutrients in the longer term. Our results are consistent with the 
literature. For example, Marenya and Barrett (2009a) find marginal returns of 17.64 kg 
maize per kg of nitrogen. 
Using historic climate data at the district-level along with our regression results, 
we can estimate the distribution of expected marginal returns of NPK and urea at each 
site for each available year. We calculate the climate indices GDD 30+, GDD 8-30 and 
rainfall (mm) for each year for each site by using the relevant dates from the 1995-1996 
field trials (e.g., silking date). We use the joint distribution of the observed climate 
indices to simulate the expected marginal returns for each available year for the trial sites. 
The availability of data varies by trials site and ranges between a start date of 1903-1976 
and an end date of 2008, as explained in Section III. We have to assume that soil 
characteristics remain constant as we do not have annual soil characteristics. The two last 
columns of Table 4 show the expected mean marginal return of urea and NPK for the 
entire set of simulated data and are close to the in-sample means (columns 2 and 3). 
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Given the distribution of expected marginal products of fertilizer and fertilizer and maize 
prices, we can estimate the probability that fertilizer is profitable for a given plot. While 
climatic conditions will affect maize prices and fertilizer prices, to a lesser degree, we 
cannot control for the variation in prices over time due to data constraints. We therefore 
use district-level median maize and fertilizer prices from the IHS data from 2009-2010, 
as described above. The expected marginal profit,! ! , from fertilizer application is  
    ! ! = ! !"! ∙ !!! − !!!,    (4) 
where !!!is the price of maize and !! is the price of fertilizer, the first  of which is 
unknown when farmers make fertilizer purchase decisions, and hence subject to 
uncertainty, hence the expectations operator.11 The price of fertilizer, however, is known 
at the time of purchase. From the standard first order conditions of the risk neutral 
producer’s profit maximizing problem, fertilizer application will be profitable in 
expectation so long as ! ! > 0, which constitutes a necessary condition for fertilizer 
application. 12  Table 5 shows the expected profitability, marginal product and 
benefit/cost13 of adding 1kg of urea or NPK. Adding 1 kg of NPK (urea) is (almost) 
always profitable in expectation.  
Maps of the expected profitability expressed in benefit/cost ratio terms offer 
strong indications as to where the gains from fertilizer use induced by subsidies are 
concentrated and their magnitude. The higher expected marginal benefit/cost ratios are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Lacking data with which to establish the joint distribution of maize prices and the 
marginal physical product of fertilizer, we must assume these are statistically 
independent, thus ! !"! ∙ !!! = ! !"!] ∙ !![!! . 
12 This is not a sufficient condition because risk aversion, liquidity constraints that force 
the farmer to borrow funds at a positive interest rate in order to purchase fertilizer, and 
other factors can still make fertilizer use unattractive even with ! ! > 0. 
13 Expressed in expected benefit/cost ratio terms, ! !"! ∙ !!! /!!! 
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concentrated in the northern region of Karonga, the western region of Mangochi and the 
southern regions of Blantyre, Chiradzulu and Thyolo.   
 Because these results are contingent on 2009-2010 prices, we also examine how 
the expected probability of profitability and benefit-cost ratios might vary with changing 
fertilizer prices, which are notoriously volatile.14 Holding maize prices fixed, we increase 
the price of the fertilizer for the treatment bundle by 50%, 100%, 200% and 500%. The 
expected profitability of fertilizer application is robust to increases in fertilizer prices up 
to 200%. But fertilizer use becomes widely – but not everywhere – unprofitable with 
fertilizer price increases of 500 % (Table 7). 
Similarly, we compare how expected marginal returns and the probability of 
expected profitability vary with changing climatic conditions. We compare results 
estimated for a drought year, 1991, and for a year with favorable rainfall and 
temperatures, 1984. The likelihood of profitability of urea decreases to 94.2% in a 
drought year, but remains profitable 100% of the time for NPK. The expected 
profitability of fertilizer irrespective of growing conditions is a striking result. Expected 
marginal benefit to cost ratios are greater than 4 in all cases (Table 8). 
 
6. Are Fertilizer Subsidies Pro-Poor? 
While fertilizer subsidy programs are often motivated by governments’ desire to 
reduce both poverty and food insecurity, this may not be an effective instrument if poorer 
farmers live in areas where growing conditions are less favorable or cultivate soils that do !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 For example, international DAP and urea prices increased roughly six-fold from 2004-
2008 before retreating sharply by 2009-10 and settling at roughly two to three times the 
2004 prices by 2012-13 (http://www.africafertilizer.org/Data-Centre/Monthly-
International-Prices-for-Fertilizers.aspx).   
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not respond as well to fertilizers as those of better-off farmers  (Kelly et al. 2011, 
Marenya and Barrett 2009a).  
 Using the poverty headcount rate maps described above, we generate the 
predicted percent of the population living below US$1.25 per capita/day at each trial site 
location. We correlate these poverty rates with the entire set of simulated expected 
marginal benefit to cost (EMBC) ratios, by district, where the number of sites per district 
vary between 57 and 5,272.  
Table 9 and Figure 5 show the correlation estimates by district and make evident 
the weak relationship between poverty and the returns of fertilizer. The mean correlation 
between urea (NPK) EMBC and poverty is 0.006 (0.069) over the entire set of data (n = 
44,501), statistically significantly different from zero at the one percent level but very 
small in magnitude. The overall correlation coefficient over the entire data set is 0.011 for 
urea and 0.001 for NPK. These very slightly positive correlations indicate that regions 
with higher poverty levels are associated with higher returns, making the benefits of 
fertilizer subsidies very mildly spatially progressive. Nevertheless, the values are 
negative for many districts, as high as -0.991 (-0.999) for urea (NPK), indicating that 
higher (low) poverty levels are associated with low returns (higher returns). The districts 
of Blantyre, Kasungu and Nkhotakota all display a high positive correlation between 
poverty rates and expected marginal returns. 
 
7. Discussion 
Our results indicate that when optimally applied (i.e., at the right time and in the 
correct quantity) the fertilizer distributed under the AISP – NPK (23:21:0+4S) – is 
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profitable in expectation in all regions in Malawi. Even if fertilizer prices were to rise by 
as much as 200%, the expected marginal benefit to cost ratio would still exceed 1. 
Furthermore, even in a drought year, the returns to fertilizer remain high. Our results 
confirm that the fertilizer recommendations from the MPTF do respond to the climate 
and soil types of Malawi, making the starter pack a good bundle to promote so as to 
profitably expand maize output.  
Our results also indicate, however, that the expected benefits of Malawi’s 
fertilizer subsidies vary significantly across space, and not always in ways that 
concentrate the gains in the poorest regions.  The overall correlation between location-
specific estimated poverty headcount rates and expected marginal returns to fertilizer is 
very mildly positive, leaving it unclear whether fertilizer subsidies really are pro-poor, 
especially if the benefits are concentrated among wealthier farmers within a given 
location (Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011). Geographic targeting of poor regions with high 
expected marginal returns could help the government of Malawi ensure its subsidy 
program is pro-poor and help increase national production (Lang et al. 2012). Targeting 
the poor in this way could not only concentrate gains in the poorest areas but also 
prospectively reduce the potential crowding out effect of subsidization. Furthermore, 
targeting the poor who otherwise might not purchase their own fertilizer would give them 
the opportunity to learn about the benefits of fertilizer application (e.g., which fertilizer to 
apply and how/when to apply it), increasing their likelihood of continued use if 
subsidization were to cease. 
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8. Conclusions 
The fertilizer bundle distributed under Malawi’s AISP appears very profitable on 
average, and across years with strikingly different growing conditions and across sub-
regions with markedly different soils and other attributes. Nevertheless, the sustainability 
of Malawi’s subsidy program remains precarious due to its high costs. Targeting regions 
known to have high quality soils that respond most highly to fertilizer and are populated 
by the worst off can help increase the efficiency of the program and reduce costs while 
achieving its goals of poverty reduction and increasing food security.  
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10. Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Field trial sites 
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Figure 2. Climate stations 
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Figure 3. Climate indices and maize yields, 1972-2004 
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Figure 4. Expected marginal benefit/cost ratio (top: NPK, bottom: urea) 
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Figure 5. Correlation coefficients between poverty headcount rates & MB/MC  
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11. Tables 
 
 Nutrients (kg/ha) Fertilizer Mean Yields (kg/ha) 
  N P S 
Basal (50 kg 
bags/ha) 
Top dressing (50 
kg bags/ha) 
1995-1996 
Trial 
1997-1998 
Trial 
1 0 0 0 0 0  1,410***   1,124***  
2 35 0 0 0 1.5 Urea 2,183 - 
3 35 10 2 1 x 23:21:0+4S 1 Urea  2,358***   1,997***  
4 69 21 4 2 x 23:21:0+4S 2 Urea  2,882***   2,523***  
5 92 21 4 2 x 23:21:0+4S 3 Urea  3,147***   2,915***  
6 96 40 0 1.75 DAP+ 3.5 Urea 2,947 - 
 Table 1. Treatments 
+ DAP: di-ammonium phosphate 
*** Differences in mean yields between years are statistically significant at the 1 % level 
 
 
  1995-1996 1997-1998 
Striga infested 27.8% 21.0% 
High striga infestation 6.4% 6.7% 
Termite infested 39.8% 38.8% 
Table 2. Summary statistics, striga and termite infestation 
 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Maize variety (D, 1 = MH18) 0.666 0.472 
Terrain is flat (D) 0.476 0.500 
Terrain is steep (D) 0.026 0.160 
Soil is sandy (D) 0.053 0.225 
Soil is sandy/clay (D) 0.021 0.144 
pH 5.881 0.410 
Soil has high cation exchange 
capacity 0.253 0.435 
Soil has high N content 0.021 0.142 
Soil has high P content 0.061 0.239 
Soil has high K content 0.881 0.324 
Table 3. Summary statistics, soil characteristics by trial site (from soil map, n=1,891) 
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  Mean Std. Dev Min  Max 
Maize 46.39 6.68 32.67 63.28 
DAP 106.19 10.89 90.00 153.00 
NPK 102.32 8.45 80.00 120.00 
UREA 97.52 5.28 89.47 110.00 
Table 4. Summary statistics prices (n = 23 districts) 
 
 
In-sample* Entire joint distribution** 
  Urea NPK Urea NPK 
Mean marginal returns 11.54 9.83 11.39 9.81 
Std. Dev. 0.98 0.96 1.49 0.97 
Median marginal 
returns 11.80 9.89 11.76 9.88 
Min. marginal returns 4.78 6.16 -1.91 5.38 
Max. marginal returns 12.85 11.80 13.77 11.86 
Table 5. Expected marginal returns of urea and NPK (23:21:0+4S) (kg maize per kg of 
fertilizer) 
* n = 2,860, **n = 44,535 
 
 
Urea NPK 
  Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Expected Profitability 0.998 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Expected Marginal 
Product 11.39 1.49 11.76 9.81 0.97 9.88 
Expected B/C 5.39 0.94 5.36 4.43 0.70 4.37 
Table 6. Expected probability of profitability, expected marginal product, expected 
benefit/cost (n = 44,535) (using 2009-2010 prices) 
 
 
  
Urea NPK 
Price increases: Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median 
50% Profitability 0.996 0.062 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
  Expected B/C 3.596 0.626 3.575 2.951 0.466 2.914 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
100% Profitability 0.993 0.082 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
  Expected B/C 2.697 0.469 2.681 2.213 0.349 2.186 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
200% Profitability 0.978 0.147 1.000 0.974 0.159 1.000 
  Expected B/C 1.798 0.313 1.787 1.475 0.233 1.457 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
500% Profitability 0.243 0.429 0.000 0.011 0.102 0.000 
  Expected B/C 0.899 0.156 0.894 0.738 0.116 0.729 
Table 7. Expected probability of profitability and expected benefit to cost ratio with 50-
500% fertilizer price increases from 2009-2010 prices (n = 44,535) 
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1984 1991 
Urea: Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median 
  Profitability 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.942 0.233 1.000 
  
Marginal 
Returns 11.654 0.862 11.827 10.586 2.676 11.479 
  B/C 5.509 0.815 5.365 4.971 1.367 5.188 
NPK:   
 
    
 
  
  Profitability 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
  
Marginal 
Returns 9.849 0.955 9.898 9.746 1.031 9.845 
  B/C 4.419 0.709 4.372 4.373 0.712 4.334 
n   1361 1353 
Table 8. Expected probability of profitability, expected marginal returns and expected 
benefit/cost for a drought year (1991) and a favorable growing year for maize (1985) 
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Urea & 
poverty 
correlation 
NPK & 
poverty 
correlation n 
Balaka -0.001 0.486 68 
Blantyre 0.560 0.547 1088 
Chikwawa -0.372 -0.098 3264 
Chiradzulu 0.399 0.274 850 
Chitipa -0.280 -0.262 1514 
Dedza 0.029 -0.060 2954 
Dowa 0.209 0.394 2453 
Karonga -0.108 0.062 2129 
Kasungu 0.592 0.500 778 
Lilongwe -0.256 -0.098 5272 
Machinga 0.269 0.358 1088 
Mangochi 0.174 0.116 2800 
Mchinji -0.991 -1.000 57 
Mulanje 0.057 0.156 1020 
Mwanza 0.002 -0.362 1190 
Mzimba -0.049 0.029 4765 
Nkhata Bay 0.444 0.353 1360 
Nkhotakota 0.713 0.761 1360 
Nsanje -0.493 -0.311 1258 
Ntcheu 0.163 -0.265 502 
Ntchisi 0.268 0.171 1092 
Phalombe -0.359 0.226 1530 
Rumphi -0.108 0.072 805 
Salima 0.412 -0.193 1496 
Thyolo -0.299 -0.220 1360 
Zomba 0.002 0.241 2482 
Table 9. Correlation between poverty headcount rates and the expected benefit/cost of 
NPK and urea. (The number of sites by district varies (n)). 
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12. Appendices  
 
A. Construction of the climate indices, following Lobell et al. (2011) 
 
Growing degree days were calculated at each field trial site as: 
 !""!"#$,!"# = ! !!!!!!!!  !! = ! 0 !"!!! < !!"#$! − !!"#$ !"!!!"#$ ≤ !!! ≤ !!"#!!"# − !!"#$ !"!!! > !!"#  
 
where t is an hour within the growing season. Tt is the average temperature during the 
hour and is determined by interpolating a sine curve between the minimum and 
maximum temperatures in a day. N is the number of hours between planting and 
harvesting. Therefore, the GDD8,30 corresponds to Tbase = 8 degrees Celsius and Topt = 30 
degrees C and GDD30+ corresponds to Tbase = 30 degrees C and T opt = infinity. 
 
Precipitation is controlled for by summing the total precipitation 10 days before and 10 
days after silking, controlling for anthesis, the period of time during which a flower is 
open and functional and most susceptible to drought.  
 
 
B. Quadratic production function results 
 
Notes: left hand side variable is yields (kg/ha); model I uses a random effects 
specification, model II uses a Hausman-Taylor specification, model III uses a random 
effects specification on the subset of sites with data from both seasons; * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01 
 
 I. RE II. H-T 
III. RE  
(balanced panel 
only) 
Year (D, 1 = 95-96) 343.724** 365.461** 353.374** 
 (41.664) (18.648) (44.008) 
N (N) Fertilizer 16.926** 16.924** 16.948** 
 (0.372) (0.497) (0.449) 
Sulphur (S) Fertilizer 25.886** 25.976** 29.155** 
 (6.542) (9.343) (7.900) 
Growing degree days index (8-30C) 0.004 0.010** 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Growing degree days index (+30C) -0.166** -0.179** -0.178** 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.052) 
Precipitation Index 0.169 -0.003 0.234 
 (0.364) (0.161) (0.382) 
pH 268.060** 332.781* 285.536** 
 (61.414) (160.150) (67.261) 
Striga infested (D) -121.002* -91.155** -116.473 
 (60.516) (32.344) (64.600) 
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Striga infested (high) (D) -551.455** -514.456** -551.903** 
 (94.138) (52.394) (101.359) 
Termite infested (D) -255.904** -307.234** -277.079** 
 (51.216) (25.199) (54.566) 
Maize variety (D, 1 = MH18) 245.942** 407.212** 233.058** 
 (51.448) (135.526) (57.706) 
Terrain is flat (D) 97.635* 242.324 135.282** 
 (43.158) (305.348) (48.784) 
Terrain is steep (D) -343.457** 1,095.497 -277.279* 
 (113.085) (752.869) (137.236) 
Soil is sandy -320.476** -1,338.079* -329.528** 
 (95.383) (656.951) (106.874) 
Soil is sandy/clay -513.868** -1,939.703 -561.435** 
 (155.396) (1,277.606) (179.156) 
Squared: N fertilizer -0.101** -0.101** -0.094** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) 
Squared: S fertilizer -35.752** -35.773** -35.725** 
 (3.965) (6.133) (4.582) 
Squared: precipitation index 0.004 0.006** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Squared: pH -8.087 131.080 37.839 
 (56.821) (178.511) (61.027) 
Interaction: GDD 8-30, pH 0.017* 0.018** 0.017* 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Interaction: GDD 30+, pH -0.025 -0.050 -0.005 
 (0.071) (0.041) (0.074) 
Interaction: Precipitation, S -0.044 -0.053 -0.011 
 (0.076) (0.067) (0.099) 
Interaction: Precipitation, pH -0.268 -0.250 -0.174 
 (0.824) (0.356) (0.860) 
Interaction: Precipitation, N 0.008* 0.008* 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Interaction: N, S Fertilizers 1.226** 1.227** 1.265** 
 (0.196) (0.277) (0.236) 
Interaction: N, pH 0.165 0.119 0.274 
 (0.561) (0.538) (0.662) 
Interaction: pH, S -2.368 -1.412 -2.113 
 (12.157) (11.500) (14.678) 
Interaction: GDD 30+, S 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
Interaction: GDD 30+, N -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Interaction: S, Flat terrain -21.180* -20.946** -30.246** 
 (8.564) (7.615) (10.469) 
Interaction: S, Steep terrain -52.008** -53.039* -67.619** 
 (18.596) (22.103) (24.576) 
Interaction: S, Sandy soil -30.896 -29.370 -47.791* 
 (16.570) (15.460) (19.979) 
Interaction: S, Sandy/Clay soil 28.022 28.930 13.086 
 (23.777) (24.850) (30.188) 
Interaction: S, High CEC -13.875 -13.137 -17.260 
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 (10.255) (9.284) (12.849) 
Interaction: S, High N -18.348 -19.364 -9.813 
 (22.491) (23.006) (28.773) 
Interaction: S, High P -47.209** -48.736** -58.807** 
 (16.865) (14.742) (20.988) 
Interaction: S, High K -1.901 -3.175 -11.477 
 (13.385) (11.859) (15.831) 
Constant 197.997** 162.873** 147.159** 
 (31.298) (50.088) (35.748) 
Within R2 0.52 . 0.49 
Between R2 0.10 . 0.12 
Overall R2 0.34 . 0.35 
N 10,984 10,984 7,996 
 
 
